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THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY DOCTRINE:  
INDIANA AS THE EXCEPTION, NOT THE 
RULE† 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person 
or thing to be seized.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It was June 8, 2001, and Amanda Concklin had just been reported 
missing by her grandmother.2  The case was assigned to Officer Vaughn 
of the Memphis, Tennessee homicide bureau, whose investigation led to 
a witness by the name of Jason Keel.  Keel informed Officer Vaughn that 
he had driven to the home of William Holland, where Amanda had 
stayed that weekend, and was told by Holland that Amanda was dead.  
Keel additionally reported that he observed Amanda’s body in a room 
adjacent to the garage and that he saw Holland “stomp” on Amanda’s 
remains, causing her body to make a gurgling sound.   
Armed with this information and believing that evidence of 
Amanda’s death was still present on Holland’s property, Officer Vaughn 
applied for a search warrant.  Within days, the search warrant was 
granted, authorizing law enforcement officers to search Holland’s home 
and garage.  On the day the warrant issued, however, Officer Vaughn 
responded to a bank robbery and murder which consumed the 
remainder of the day.  The following day, Officer Vaughn’s plan to 
execute the search warrant at Holland’s home was again delayed as he 
was needed to assist with the interview of a suspect in the previous day’s 
bank robbery.  While conducting this interview, Officer Vaughn was 
informed that other officers uninvolved with his investigation of 
Holland had discovered a body at Holland’s home. 
Responding to an anonymous tip to the Crime Stoppers hotline that 
a woman’s deceased body was wrapped in a camouflage sleeping bag in 
a vehicle parked in Holland’s garage, two patrol officers drove to 
Holland’s home to investigate.  Neither officer was aware that Officer 
                                                 
† Winner of the 2008 Valparaiso University Law Review’s Scribes Award 
1 IND. CONST. art. 1, § 11. 
2 The situation described below is based on actual events that occurred during the 
police investigation of William Holland as reported by the Honorable Diane Vescovo, 
United States Magistrate Judge for the United States District Court for the Western District 
of Tennessee in United States v. Holland, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14090 (W.D. TN 2003). 
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Vaughn was investigating Holland or that Officer Vaughn had 
previously obtained a search warrant for Holland’s residence.  While 
standing near Holland’s garage, the two officers reported that they 
smelled an odor consistent with decomposing human remains.  
Believing that the tip to Crime Stoppers had been corroborated, the 
officers forced entry into the garage without first obtaining a search 
warrant.   
Prior to trial, in a motion to suppress, Holland argued that the 
officers’ search of his garage without a search warrant was 
constitutionally unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.3  His argument was sound and 
the district court agreed, finding that although the officers had probable 
cause to believe that a body may have been concealed in the garage, the 
officers’ warrantless search of the garage was unconstitutional. 
In light of the exclusionary rule, which the Supreme Court has held 
requires that all evidence obtained through police misconduct ordinarily 
must be suppressed in a subsequent criminal prosecution of the 
accused,4 it would seem that the misconduct of the two patrol officers 
should result in suppression of the evidence of the body that was 
discovered by the unlawful search of Holland’s garage.  Such a result, 
however, seems incredibly unjust in light of the fact that Officer Vaughn, 
armed with a validly issued search warrant and without any reference to 
the misconduct of the patrol officers, inevitably would have lawfully 
discovered the very same evidence.  Although, in United States v. Holland, 
Officer Vaughn completely obeyed the mandates of the Fourth 
Amendment by obtaining a search warrant which he would have soon 
executed, the officers who actually conducted the search of the garage 
did not.  In their haste to recover the body of a murder victim, they 
searched Holland’s garage without judicial authorization to do so.  
Accordingly, application of the exclusionary rule to the misconduct of 
the two well-intentioned, but over-anxious, officers would require the 
suppression of the murder victim’s body and all associated evidence 
obtained during the officers’ unlawful search of the garage.  
                                                 
3 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  The Amendment provides: 
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
4 See infra notes 26–27 and accompanying text; see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 
(1961) (explaining that “all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the 
Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.”). 
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Consequently, of course, bringing Amanda’s murderer to justice would 
prove extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, for the prosecution.   
As the facts illustrate, and as the United States Supreme Court has 
itself recognized, a blanket application of the exclusionary rule to all 
evidence unlawfully obtained by police, regardless of whether the police 
would inevitably have discovered the evidence, would inflict upon 
society a tremendous cost while at the same time do little to promote the 
purposes of the exclusionary rule.5  It is for this reason that the Supreme 
Court under the United States Constitution, and virtually every state 
court under its respective state constitution, has adopted some variation 
of the inevitable discovery doctrine.6  The Indiana Court of Appeals, 
however, has categorically rejected the inevitable discovery doctrine as a 
matter of Indiana constitutional law, without providing any significant 
justification for doing so.7   
Under the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme 
Court, because Officer Vaughn would inevitably have discovered 
Amanda’s body without reference to the police misconduct, the evidence 
would be admissible in Holland’s trial.8  However, under the Indiana 
Constitution, as presently interpreted by the Indiana Court of Appeals, 
no cure would exist for the unconstitutional search of Holland’s garage, 
despite the fact that Officer Vaughn would inevitably have conducted 
that very same search pursuant to a properly obtained search warrant, 
                                                 
5 See infra note 28 (recognizing not only the benefits but also the substantial costs of the 
exclusionary rule and that application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where 
its remedial objectives are likely most efficaciously served). 
6 See infra note 37 and accompanying text; see also Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 
(1984) (explaining that “[i]f the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by 
lawful means[] . . . []then the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence 
should be received.  Anything less would reject logic, experience, and common sense.”) 
(internal footnote omitted).  See also infra note 55 (observing that only Indiana and Texas 
appear to have expressly refused to recognize the inevitable discovery rule and finding that 
only three states appear to have never directly addressed the issue of the inevitable 
discovery rule). 
7 See generally infra notes 74–81 and accompanying text (observing that the Indiana 
Court of Appeals, in one sweeping statement with no analysis of the varying forms in 
which the inevitable discovery exception might be adopted, rejected application of the 
exception under any circumstances). 
8 See infra note 37 and accompanying text; see also Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 
(1984) (explaining that “[i]f the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by 
lawful means[] . . . []then the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence 
should be received.  Anything less would reject logic, experience, and common sense.”) 
(internal footnote omitted). 
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and Holland would undoubtedly avoid a conviction for the murder of 
Amanda Concklin.9 
The purpose of this Note is to illustrate the need for the Indiana 
Supreme Court to adopt the inevitable discovery doctrine as a 
constitutional exception to the exclusionary rule under the Indiana 
Constitution and to provide a logical formulation of the doctrine for 
Indiana courts to follow.  Additionally, this Note is intended to 
encourage Indiana’s prosecuting attorneys and the Indiana Attorney 
General’s Office to continue to raise the inevitable discovery doctrine in 
future cases until such time as the Supreme Court of Indiana 
conclusively resolves whether the inevitable discovery doctrine is 
consistent with Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.  Part 
II.A of this Note discusses the inevitable discovery exception as adopted 
by the United States Supreme Court.10  Part II.B discusses some of the 
diverging opinions of legal commentators on the strengths and 
weaknesses of the inevitable discovery exception as adopted by the 
United States Supreme Court.11  Part II.C discusses the various 
formulations of the inevitable discovery doctrine adopted by the states.12  
Part III analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the various 
formulations of the inevitable discovery exception.13  Finally, Part IV 
proposes the adoption of a formulation of the inevitable discovery 
exception that, within the confines of Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana 
Constitution, furthers the purposes of the exclusionary rule while, at the 
same time, does not overlook the enormous cost inflicted upon society 
by the exclusion of evidence of unquestioned truth.14 
II.  BACKGROUND:  THE MANY FACES OF THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY 
EXCEPTION 
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized the 
exclusionary rule, which generally renders inadmissible in a criminal 
                                                 
9 See infra notes 78–79 and accompanying text (interpreting a single statement of the 
Indiana Supreme Court as forever foreclosing the availability of the inevitable discovery 
exception in any form under any circumstances as a matter of Indiana constitutional law). 
10 See infra Part II.A (discussing the basic framework adopted by the Supreme Court in 
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), for application in inevitable discovery cases). 
11 See infra Part II.B (discussing the many varying opinions of legal commentators as to 
the wisdom of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984)). 
12 See infra Part II.C (discussing many of the differing formulations of the inevitable 
discovery exception adopted by various state courts). 
13 See infra Part III (discussing the most frequently debated strengths and weaknesses of 
the varying formulations of the inevitable discovery exception). 
14 See infra Part IV (proposing a formulation of the inevitable discovery exception to be 
applied by Indiana courts in inevitable discovery cases). 
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trial any evidence obtained by the government as a result of police 
misconduct.15  Throughout its history, however, many exceptions to the 
exclusionary rule have developed.16  One such exception is the inevitable 
discovery doctrine.17  Part II.A discusses the inevitable discovery 
exception as it was adopted by the United States Supreme Court.18  Part 
II.B discusses some of the many opinions of legal commentators on the 
strengths and weaknesses of the inevitable discovery exception as 
adopted by the United States Supreme Court.19  Part II.C discusses the 
various formulations of the inevitable discovery doctrine adopted by the 
states.20 
In order to more thoroughly explore the inevitable discovery 
doctrine, a brief discussion of the reasons for, and development of, the 
exclusionary rule is appropriate.21  The charge and effect of the Fourth 
Amendment of the United State Constitution is to restrain  
the courts of the United States and Federal officials, in 
the exercise of their power and authority, under 
limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such 
power and authority, and to forever secure the people, 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against all 
unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of 
law.22 
                                                 
15 See infra notes 26–27; see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (explaining that 
“all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that 
same authority, inadmissible in a state court[]”). 
16 See infra note 31 (recognizing that the warrant requirement has become so riddled 
with exceptions as to render it basically unrecognizable). 
17 See infra note 37 and accompanying text; see also Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 
(1984) (explaining that “[i]f the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by 
lawful means[] . . . []then the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence 
should be received.  Anything less would reject logic, experience, and common sense.”) 
(internal footnote omitted). 
18 See infra Part II.A (discussing the basic framework adopted by the Supreme Court in 
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), for application in inevitable discovery cases). 
19 See infra Part II.B (discussing the many varying opinions of legal commentators as to 
the wisdom of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984)). 
20 See infra Part II.C (discussing many of the differing formulations of the inevitable 
discovery exception adopted by various state courts). 
21 See generally infra notes 21–31 and accompanying text (discussing the development of, 
and justifications for, the exclusionary rule under the United States Constitution). 
22 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392, 391–92 (1914).  In Weeks, police officers had 
gone to Weeks’s house and, after being told by a neighbor where Weeks kept a key to the 
house, found the key and entered the house.  Id. at 386.  The police then searched Weeks’s 
room and took possession of various papers and articles found there, which were 
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In Weeks v. United States, the Court adopted the exclusionary rule as a 
necessary tool to ensure that Constitutional prohibitions are respected 
and that Constitutional rights are protected.23  Since Weeks, the Court has 
recognized that the exclusionary rule serves the following two dominant 
functions:  (1) deterring lawless conduct by federal officers and (2) 
closing the doors of the federal courts to the use of evidence obtained 
unconstitutionally.24  Initially, in Wolf v. Colorado, the Court determined 
that the exclusionary rule applied only when an illegal search or seizure 
was perpetrated by the federal government.25  However, in Mapp v. 
Ohio,26 the Court overruled its prior decision in Wolf, and held that “all 
evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the 
Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.”27 
                                                                                                             
afterward turned over to the United States Marshal.  Id.  Later in the same day police 
officers returned with the Marshal, who thought he might find additional evidence.  Id.  
After being admitted by someone in the house, the Marshal searched Weeks’s room and 
carried away certain letters and envelopes found in the drawer of a chiffonier.  Id.  Neither 
the Marshal nor the police officers had obtained a search warrant prior to entering and 
searching Weeks’s home.  Id. 
23  Id. at 394 (noting that “the 4th Amendment was intended to secure the citizen in 
person and property against unlawful invasion of the sanctity of his home by officers of the 
law acting under legislative or judicial sanction[]” and holding that “[t]o sanction such 
proceedings would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect, if not an open 
defiance, of the prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for the protection of the people 
against such unauthorized action”). 
24 See, e.g., Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599 (1975); see also, Figert v. State, 686 N.E.2d 
827, 833 (Ind. 1997) (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984)). In Figert, the 
Indiana Supreme Court accepted that “the exclusionary rule is designed to deter police 
misconduct. . . .”  Id. 
 (quotation marks omitted).  
25 See 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949) (holding, without ever discussing the facts of the case, “in a 
prosecution in a State court for a State crime the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid 
the admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure[]”) 
26 367 U.S. 643 (1961).   
27 Id. at 655.  In Mapp, police officers sought entrance to Ms. Mapp’s home and, when 
Ms. Mapp did not come to the door immediately, at least one of the several doors to the 
house was forcibly opened and the policemen gained admittance.  Id. at 644.  Thereafter, 
the Court described in detail the disturbing conduct of the police that followed:   
Meanwhile, Miss Mapp’s attorney arrived, but the officers, having 
secured their own entry, and continuing in their defiance of the law, 
would permit him neither to see Miss Mapp nor to enter the house.  It 
appears that Miss Mapp was halfway down the stairs from the upper 
floor to the front door when the officers, in this highhanded manner, 
broke into the hall.  She demanded to see the search warrant.  A paper, 
claimed to be a warrant, was held up by one of the officers.  She 
grabbed the “warrant” and placed it in her bosom.  A struggle ensued 
in which the officers recovered the piece of paper and as a result of 
which they handcuffed appellant because she had been “belligerent” 
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Although the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule is broad, the 
Court has often observed that the exclusionary rule has never been 
interpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in 
all proceedings or against all persons.28  Moreover, the Court has 
repeatedly emphasized that the use of evidence obtained in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment does not itself violate the Constitution.29  Since 
the Court’s adoption of the exclusionary rule in 1914, the Court has 
                                                                                                             
in resisting their official rescue of the “warrant” from her person.  
Running roughshod over appellant, a policeman “grabbed” her, 
“twisted [her] hand,” and she “yelled [and] pleaded with him” 
because “it was hurting.”  Appellant, in handcuffs, was then forcibly 
taken upstairs to her bedroom where the officers searched a dresser, a 
chest of drawers, a closet and some suitcases.  They also looked into a 
photo album and through personal papers belonging to the appellant.  
The search spread to the rest of the second floor including the child’s 
bedroom, the living room, the kitchen and a dinette.  The basement of 
the building and a trunk found therein were also searched.  The 
obscene materials for possession of which she was ultimately 
convicted were discovered in the course of that widespread search.   
 At the trial no search warrant was produced by the prosecution, 
nor was the failure to produce one explained or accounted for.  At best, 
“There is, in the record, considerable doubt as to whether there ever 
was any warrant for the search of defendant’s home.” 
Id. at 644–45. 
28 See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 275 (1978) (recognizing not only the 
benefits but also the substantial costs of the exclusionary rule and that application of the 
rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most 
efficaciously served). 
29 See Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 362 (1998).  The Court observed that 
a Fourth Amendment violation is “fully accomplished” by an illegal search or seizure, and 
no exclusion of evidence from a judicial or administrative proceeding can cure the invasion 
of the defendant's rights which he has already suffered.  Id.  Accordingly, the Court has 
reiterated that “the exclusionary rule is instead a judicially created means of deterring 
illegal searches and seizures[]” and has held that, because the rule is prudential rather than 
constitutionally mandated, it is applicable only where its deterrence benefits outweigh its 
substantial social costs.  Id. at 363 (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 
(1974)). 
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carved out numerous exceptions to the rule.30  One such exception to the 
exclusionary rule is the inevitable discovery doctrine.31   
                                                 
30 See James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 311 (1990) (allowing exceptions where the 
introduction of reliable and probative evidence would significantly further the truth-
seeking function of a criminal trial and the likelihood that admissibility of such evidence 
would encourage police misconduct is but a speculative possibility).  See also California v. 
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582–83 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).  Justice Scalia recognized that 
the warrant requirement has become so riddled with exceptions as to render it basically 
unrecognizable. Id.  Justice Scalia further observed that in 1985, one commentator had 
catalogued nearly twenty such exceptions and that, since then, the Court had added two 
more.  Id. (citing Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 
1468, 1473–74 (1985)). 
31 See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984) (holding that “[i]f the prosecution can 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably 
would have been discovered by lawful means[] . . . []then the deterrence rationale has so 
little basis that the evidence should be received”) (internal footnote omitted).  In Nix, 
Williams was a suspect in the kidnapping of 10-year-old Pamela Powers, who had 
disappeared from a YMCA building in Des Moines, Iowa.  Id. at 434.  Shortly after Pamela 
disappeared, Williams had been observed leaving the YMCA carrying a large bundle 
wrapped in a blanket, and a 14-year-old boy reported that, while helping Williams open his 
car door, he had seen “two legs in [the bundle] and they were skinny and white.”  Id.  The 
next day, authorities located Williams’ car 160 miles east of Des Moines in Davenport, 
Iowa, and police also discovered several items of clothing belonging to the child, some of 
Williams’ clothing, and an army blanket like the one Williams used to carry the bundle out 
of the YMCA, at a rest stop on Interstate 80 near Grinnell, between Des Moines and 
Davenport.  Id. at 434–35.  Based on this information, a warrant was issued for Williams’ 
arrest.  Id. at 435.  Believing that Williams may have left Pamela Powers or her body 
somewhere between Des Moines and the Grinnell rest stop where some of Pamela’s 
clothing was found, the Iowa Bureau of Criminal Investigation initiated a large scale 
search.  Id.  Approximately two hundred volunteers divided into teams and began 
searching the 21-mile area east of Grinnell, covering several miles north and south of 
Interstate 80.  Id.  The search teams were instructed to check all roads, abandoned farm 
buildings, ditches, culverts, and any other place in which Pamela’s body could be hidden.  
Id.  As the massive search effort progressed, Williams surrendered to authorities in 
Davenport and was promptly arraigned.  Id.  Williams contacted an attorney in Des 
Moines, who arranged for a Davenport attorney to meet Williams at the Davenport police 
station.  Id.  Des Moines detectives, who had made arrangements to transport Williams 
from Davenport to Des Moines, assured Williams’ counsel that they would not question 
Williams during the return trip to Des Moines.  Id.  During that trip, however, one of the 
detectives began a conversation with Williams, saying: 
I want to give you something to think about while we’re traveling 
down the road. . . .  They are predicting several inches of snow for 
tonight, and I feel that you yourself are the only person that knows 
where this little girl’s body is . . . and if you get a snow on top of it you 
yourself may be unable to find it.  And since we will be going right 
past the area [where the body is] on the way into Des Moines, I feel 
that we could stop and locate the body, that the parents of this little 
girl should be entitled to a Christian burial for the little girl who was 
snatched away from them on Christmas [E]ve and murdered. . . .  
[A]fter a snow storm [we may not be] able to find it at all. 
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A. The Inevitable Discovery Exception and the United States Constitution 
In Nix v. Williams, the Court expressly held that logic, experience, 
and common sense necessitated the adoption of the inevitable discovery 
doctrine as a logical exception to the exclusionary rule.32  The precise 
issue before the Court in Nix was whether evidence pertaining to the 
discovery and condition of a murder victim’s body, obtained through 
improper questioning by a detective in violation of the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment rights, could properly be admitted on the ground that the 
body would inevitably have been discovered, even if no violation of any 
constitutional or statutory provision had taken place.33 
                                                                                                             
Id. at 435–36 (quotation marks omitted).  After telling Williams that he knew that the body 
was in the area of Mitchellville which was a town they would be passing on the way to Des 
Moines, the detective concluded the conversation by saying:  “I do not want you to answer 
me. . . .  Just think about it. . . .  Id. at 436.  Later, as they approached Mitchellville, Williams 
agreed to lead the officers to Pamela’s body.  Id.  Upon learning that Williams had agreed 
to lead authorities to Pamela’s body, the officers in charge of the search effort called off the 
search.  Id.  At the time the search ended, one search team was only two and one-half miles 
from where Williams soon led the detectives to Pamela’s body.  Id.  Pamela’s body was 
found next to a culvert in a ditch beside a gravel road about two miles south of Interstate 
80, essentially within the area to be searched.  Id. 
32 See 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984) (holding, “[i]f the prosecution can establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have 
been discovered by lawful means[] . . . []then the deterrence rationale has so little basis that 
the evidence should be received.”) (internal footnote omitted). 
33 Id. at 434.  Prior to Williams trial for the first-degree murder of ten year-old Pamela 
Powers, his counsel moved to suppress evidence of Pamela’s body and all related evidence, 
including the condition of her body, stating that it was the “fruit” or product of an 
unlawful interrogation in violation of Williams’ Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of 
counsel.  Id. at 436–37.  In the Court’s earlier decision in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 
(1977), the Court held that the detective, through his “Christian burial speech,” had 
obtained incriminating statements from Williams through what was viewed as an 
interrogation in violation of Williams’ Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  Id. at 400–01 
(affirming the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in 
Williams v. Brewer, 509 F.2d 227, 234 (1974), which affirmed the decision of the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of Iowa in Williams v. Brewer, 375 F. Supp. 170, 186 
(1974), granting Williams’ petition for a writ of habeas corpus). 
At Williams’ trial, prosecutors did not offer Williams’ statements into evidence, 
nor did prosecutors offer evidence that Williams had led authorities to Pamela’s body.  Nix, 
467 U.S. at 437.  Rather, the prosecution only admitted evidence of the condition of the 
body as it was found, articles and photographs of her clothing, and post-mortem medical 
and chemical tests on the body.  Id.  After trial, the jury again convicted Williams of first-
degree murder and he was sentenced to life in prison.  Id.  In deciding to admit the 
evidence derived from the discovery of Pamela’s body, the trial court ruled: 
[T]he State had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that, if the 
search had not been suspended and Williams had not led the police to 
the victim, her body would have been discovered “within a short time” 
in essentially the same condition as it was actually found. 
Id. at 437–38.  The trial court then concluded: 
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The Court commenced its analysis of the inevitable discovery 
doctrine by noting as follows:  “the ‘vast majority’ of all courts, both state 
and federal, recognize an inevitable discovery exception to the 
exclusionary rule.”34  Recognizing the functional similarity between the 
independent source exception to the exclusionary rule and the inevitable 
discovery doctrine, the Court concluded that the rationale underlying 
the independent source exception was wholly consistent with, and 
justified the Court’s adoption of, the inevitable discovery doctrine as an 
exception to the exclusionary rule.35  Additionally, throughout its 
opinion in Nix, the Court emphasized that, although the prosecution is 
not to be put in a better position than it would have been in if no 
illegality had transpired, this “derivative evidence analysis ensures that 
the prosecution is not put in a worse position simply because of some 
earlier police error or misconduct.”36 
                                                                                                             
[I]f the police had not located the body, the search would clearly have been  
taken up again where it left off, given the extreme circumstances of 
this case and the body would [have] been found in short order. 
Id. at 438 (quotation marks omitted).  On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district 
court’s denial of Williams’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and the Supreme Court 
granted the State’s petition for certiorari.  Id. at 440. 
34 Id.  In fact, at the time of the Court’s decision in Nix v. Williams, every federal court of 
appeals having jurisdiction over criminal matters had endorsed the inevitable discovery 
exception.  Id. at 441 n.2.  In Nix v. Williams, the Eighth Circuit likewise assumed that there 
was an inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule to be applied in instances 
where the police would have discovered the evidence without the constitutional violation, 
but held that the State had not satisfied its burden of proof on a second requirement of the 
inevitable discovery exception—the requirement that the police had not acted in bad faith.  
Id. at 440. 
35 Id. at 443–44.  Looking to precedent, the Court noted that in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. 
United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), it held that the exclusionary rule applies both to illegally 
obtained evidence as well as to other incriminating evidence derived from the primary 
evidence, and that “[i]f knowledge of [such facts] is gained from an independent source, they 
may be proved like any others. . . .”  Nix, 467 U.S. at 441 (citing Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. 
U.S., 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920)).  The Court further noted that, in Wong Sun v. United States, 
371 U.S. 471, 487–88 (1963), it had previously held: 
We need not hold that all evidence is ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ simply because 
it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police.  
Rather, the more apt question in such a case is ‘whether, granting 
establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant 
objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or 
instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the 
primary taint.’ 
Nix, 467 U.S. at 442. 
36 Id. at 443.  The Court, observing that “[t]he independent source doctrine allows 
admission of evidence that has been discovered by means wholly independent of any 
constitutional violation[,]” explained: 
The independent source doctrine teaches us that the interest of society in 
deterring unlawful police conduct and the public interest in having 
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Having expressly adopted the inevitable discovery exception, the 
Court next determined that, in order for the inevitable discovery 
exception to apply, the prosecution must show by a preponderance of 
the evidence only that the challenged evidence inevitably would have 
been discovered by lawful means.37  Rejecting the argument proffered by 
Williams, that the correct standard should be that of clear and 
convincing evidence, the Court distinguished the inevitable discovery 
doctrine from the cases in which the court has required clear and 
convincing evidence.38 
Finally, the Court rejected the decision by the court of appeals that 
the inevitable discovery doctrine should be available only in cases where 
the prosecution can prove the absence of bad faith.39  The Court 
                                                                                                             
juries receive all probative evidence of a crime are properly balanced 
by putting the police in the same, not a worse, position than that they 
would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred. 
Id. (citing Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964); 
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 457–59 (1972)).  The Court further recognized that 
its failure to adopt the inevitable discovery exception would disregard the balance of the 
interest in deterring police misconduct and the interest in making available to juries all 
probative evidence of a crime.  Nix, 467 U.S. at 444.   As the Court explained, “exclusion of 
evidence that would inevitably have been discovered would also put the government in a 
worse position, because the police would have obtained that evidence if no misconduct had 
taken place.”  Id. 
37 Id. at 444 & n.5.   In an oft-quoted statement, the Court explained: 
If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by 
lawful means—here the volunteers’ search—then the deterrence 
rationale has so little basis that the evidence should be received.  
Anything less would reject logic, experience, and common sense. 
Id. (internal footnote omitted) (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 178 n.14 (1974), 
in which the Court held:  “the controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings should 
impose no greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence[]”).  Adopting this 
same burden for use in cases in which the State is seeking application of the inevitable 
discovery exception, the Court explained, “[w]e are unwilling to impose added burdens on 
the already difficult task of proving guilt in criminal cases by enlarging the barrier to 
placing evidence of unquestioned truth before juries.”  Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 n.5. 
38 Id. (citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (requiring clear and convincing 
evidence of an independent source for an in-court identification, recognizing the effect an 
uncounseled pretrial identification has in crystallizing the witnesses’ identification of the 
defendant for future reference and the difficulty of determining whether an in-court 
identification was based on independent recollection unaided by the lineup identification)).  
The Court further reasoned that the heightened standard of clear and convincing evidence 
was unnecessary in inevitable discovery cases because “inevitable discovery involves no 
speculative elements but focuses on demonstrated historical facts capable of ready 
verification or impeachment and does not require a departure from the usual burden of 
proof at suppression hearings.”  Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 n.5. 
39 See id. at 445–48.  The Court further reasoned in part that its decision, in Wong Sun, 
“pointedly negated the kind of good-faith requirement advanced by the Court of Appeals 
in reversing the District Court.”  Nix, 467 U.S. at 442.  In Wong Sun, the Court extended the 
Shively: The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine: Indiana as the Exception, Not
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008
418 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
explained, “[t]he requirement that the prosecution must prove the 
absence of bad faith[] . . . would place courts in the position of 
withholding from juries relevant and undoubted truth that would have 
been available to police absent any unlawful police activity[]” and that 
the police would then be placed in a worse position than if no unlawful 
conduct had occurred.40   
In Nix, the Court expressly held that “the societal costs of the 
exclusionary rule far outweigh any possible benefits to deterrence that a 
good-faith requirement might produce.”41  In addition, the Court found 
that “[e]xclusion of physical evidence that would inevitably have been 
discovered adds nothing to either the integrity or fairness of a criminal 
trial.”42  Thus, the Court held:  “when, as here, the evidence in question 
                                                                                                             
reach of the exclusionary rule to include evidence that was the indirect “fruit” of unlawful 
police conduct, but the Court again emphasized that evidence that has been illegally 
obtained need not always be suppressed.  See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. 471, 487–88 (1963). 
40 Nix, 467 U.S. at 445.  The Court also rejected the reasoning of the court of appeals that 
“if an absence-of-bad-faith requirement were not imposed, ‘the temptation to risk 
deliberate violations of the Sixth Amendment would be too great, and the deterrent effect 
of the Exclusionary Rule reduced too far.”  Id. (quoting Williams v. Nix, 467 F.2d, at 1169 
n.5).  The Court reasoned that “[a] police officer who is faced with the opportunity to 
obtain evidence illegally will rarely, if ever, be in a position to calculate whether the 
evidence sought would inevitably be discovered.”  Id. (citation omitted).  Instead, contrary 
to the argument of the court of appeals, the Court determined that if a police officer is 
aware that evidence will inevitably be discovered, he will try to avoid engaging in 
questionable practices because “there will be little to gain from taking any dubious 
‘shortcuts’ to obtain the evidence.”  Id. at 446.   
41 Id. at 446.  Moreover, recognizing that requiring the prosecution to prove the absence 
of bad faith would at times require the exclusion of evidence that would have inevitably 
been discovered without any reference to illegal conduct, the Court observed that such a 
result “wholly fails to take into account the enormous societal cost of excluding truth in the 
search for truth in the administration of justice[]” and that “[n]othing in this Court's prior 
holdings supports any such formalistic, pointless, and punitive approach.”  Id. at 445.  The 
Court found additional support for its adoption of the inevitable discovery exception in 
Judge, later Justice, Cardozo’s observation that under the exclusionary rule, “‘[t]he criminal 
is to go free because the constable has blundered.’”  Id. at 447 (quoting People v. Defore, 
242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926)).  The Court noted that Judge Cardozo 
prophetically considered how far-reaching the societal effect of the exclusionary rule would 
be when “[the] pettiest peace officer would have it in his power through overzeal or 
indiscretion to confer immunity upon an offender for crimes the most flagitious.”  Nix, 467 
U.S. at 447–48 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Defore, 242 N.Y. at 23, 150 N.E. at 588).  
Even more prophetically, Judge Cardozo speculated that some day, “some court might 
press the exclusionary rule to the outer limits of its logic—or beyond—and suppress 
evidence relating to the ‘body of a murdered’ victim because of the means by which it was 
found.”  Nix, 467 U.S. at 448 (citing Defore, 242 N.Y. at 23–24, 150 N.E. at 588). 
42 Nix, 467 U.S. at 446.  Recognizing that no one could seriously question the reliability of 
Pamela’s body as evidence, the Court explained that “[s]uppression, in these 
circumstances, would do nothing whatever to promote the integrity of the trial process, but 
would inflict a wholly unacceptable burden on the administration of criminal justice.”  Id. 
at 447.  The Court further noted that exclusion of this evidence would do nothing to ensure 
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would inevitably have been discovered without reference to the police 
error or misconduct, there is no nexus sufficient to provide a taint and 
the evidence is admissible.”43   
In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens wrote to emphasize the 
gravity of the constitutional violation perpetrated by the detectives in 
questioning Williams without the presence of counsel; nevertheless, 
Justice Stevens agreed with the majority’s adoption of the inevitable 
discovery exception and the majority’s rejection of a good faith 
requirement.44 
Justice Brennan, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Marshall, 
also agreed with the majority that the inevitable discovery exception to 
the exclusionary rule is consistent with the requirements of the 
                                                                                                             
the fairness of the criminal trial, reasoning that fairness can be ensured merely “by placing 
the State and the accused in the same positions they would have been in had the 
impermissible conduct not taken place.”  Id.  Consequently, the Court determined: 
[I]f the government can prove that the evidence would have been 
obtained inevitably and, therefore, would have been admitted, 
regardless of any overreaching by the police, there is no rational basis 
to keep that evidence from the jury in order to ensure the fairness of 
the trial proceedings.  In that situation, the State has gained no 
advantage at trial and the defendant has suffered no prejudice.  
Indeed, suppression of the evidence would operate to undermine the 
adversary system by putting the State in a worse position than it would 
have occupied without any police misconduct. 
Id. 
43 Id. at 448.  Applying the inevitable discovery doctrine to the facts in Nix and reversing 
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Court explained,  
“[o]n this record it is clear that the search parties were approaching the 
actual location of the body, and we are satisfied, along with three 
courts earlier, that the volunteer search teams would have resumed the 
search had Williams not earlier led police to the body and the body 
inevitably would have been found.” 
Id. at 449–50. 
44 Id. at 451–57.  In rejecting a requirement of proof of the absence of any bad faith on the 
part of the offending officer, Justice Stevens explained:  
Admission of the victim’s body, if it would have been discovered 
anyway, means that the trial in this case was not the product of an 
inquisitorial process; that process was untainted by illegality.  The 
good or bad faith of [the detective]. . . is therefore simply irrelevant.  If 
the trial process was not tainted as a result of his conduct, this 
defendant received the type of trial that the Sixth Amendment 
envisions. 
Id. at 456 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  Justice Stevens further rejected the opinion 
of the court of appeals that, without a good faith requirement, the inevitable discovery 
doctrine would encourage police misconduct, reasoning instead that “[w]hen the burden of 
proof on the inevitable discovery question is placed on the prosecution, it must bear the 
risk of error in the determination made necessary by its constitutional violation.”  Id. 
(citation omitted) 
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Constitution; however, Justice Brennan argued that the State should be 
required to satisfy the more onerous burden of proving by clear and 
convincing evidence that the evidence truly would have been discovered 
by lawful means and without reference to the illegality.45  It is on this 
issue, concerning the proper standard of proof in inevitable discovery 
cases, that the Court’s opinion in Nix has received its most fierce 
criticism.46 
B. The Inevitable Discovery Exception and the Opinions of Legal 
Commentators 
Almost immediately after the Court’s decision in Nix, legal 
commentators began publishing articles analyzing and criticizing the 
form of the inevitable discovery exception adopted by the Court in Nix.47  
Although these articles illustrate the varying opinions regarding the 
inevitable discovery exception, the arguments of critics of the inevitable 
discovery rule most frequently “are directed not so much to the rule 
itself as to its application in a loose and unthinking fashion.”48  One such 
commentator concluded that the inevitable discovery exception will be a 
valuable, but easily abused, exception to the exclusionary rule in light of 
the low standard of proof adopted by the Court in Nix.49  Another 
                                                 
45 Id. at 460 (reasoning that increasing the burden of proof to that of clear and convincing 
evidence “serves to impress the factfinder with the importance of the decision and thereby 
reduces the risk that illegally obtained evidence will be admitted[]”); see also infra notes 93–
109 (providing similar arguments in support of a requirement of proof by clear and 
convincing evidence that the State would inevitably have obtained the challenged evidence 
by lawful means). 
46 See generally infra Part II.B (discussing the varying opinions of legal commentators 
with respect to the Court’s opinion in Nix v. Williams). 
47 See generally supra notes 48–54 (providing examples of legal commentators criticizing 
various aspects of the Court’s decision in Nix v. Williams). 
48 See 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE 11.4, at 243–44 (3d ed. 1996) (suggesting 
that courts must take care to ensure that the inevitable discovery exception is only applied 
in appropriate cases). 
49 See William M. Cohn, Supreme Court Review:  Sixth Amendment—Inevitable Discovery:  A 
Valuable but Easily Abused Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501 
(1984), 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 729 (1984).  Cohn agreed with the premise of the 
inevitable discovery exception that the illegality is not the cause of discovery at all, 
reasoning that conduct is not a legal cause of an event if the event would have occurred 
without the illegality.  Id. at 746.  Cohn, however, disagreed with the Court’s decision 
regarding the applicability of the inevitable discovery exception to the facts in Nix.  Id. at 
751.  Cohn argued that “[i]n any case in which the inevitable discovery rule is applicable, 
the court must examine thoroughly the facts of the case before the rule is introduced, in 
order to determine if the evidence indeed would have been discovered regardless of the 
police[] misconduct.”  Id. at 750.  Cohn further argued, “[a] spotty and imprecise treatment 
of the facts, such as that undertaken by the Court in [Nix], leads to a mechanical application 
of the rule and detracts from the logic that determines its validity.”  Id.  Determining that, 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 1 [2008], Art. 9
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss1/9
2008] The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine 421 
commentator, with similar sentiments, argued that the Court correctly 
adopted the inevitable discovery exception, but that it more wisely 
should have adopted a clear and convincing standard of proof.50  Yet 
another commentator strongly condemned the Court’s adoption of the 
proof by a preponderance of the evidence standard as evidence of the 
Court’s determination “to utilize any theory or any vehicle which would 
enable Williams’ conviction to stand[]” and as demonstrating “an 
inability to divorce itself from the evidence of a defendant's perceived 
guilt in order to unemotionally decide the validity of his constitutional 
claims.”51 
                                                                                                             
contrary to the Court’s conclusion, the record in Nix did not show clearly that the body 
would inevitably have been found, Cohn essentially accused the Court of settling for a 
lesser standard of proof in light of the brutality of the crime.  Id.  Rejecting the Court’s 
acceptance of proof by a preponderance as the appropriate standard in inevitable discovery 
cases, Cohn agreed with the dissent in Nix that “[r]equiring the prosecution to present clear 
and convincing evidence of inevitable discovery before concluding that the prosecution has 
met its burden of proof would deter judicial abuse of a valuable exception to the 
exclusionary rule and would protect the fundamental rights that the rule guarantees.”  Id. 
at 752.  Concluding that “the integrity of the inevitable discovery doctrine demands that 
courts apply the rule in a consistent and neutral fashion, regardless of the facts of a case[,]” 
Cohn argued that “[w]hen a court permits the degree of a crime to dictate the requisite 
burden of proof, as the Supreme Court did in [Nix], the court strips the inevitable discovery 
doctrine of its strength and severely undermines the doctrine's value as an exception to the 
exclusionary rule.”  Id. at 752–53. 
50 See James Andrew Fishkin, Nix v. Williams, An Analysis of the Preponderance Standard 
for the Inevitable Discovery Exception, 70 IOWA L. REV. 1369, 1383 (1985) (arguing that a 
standard of clear and convincing proof is appropriate in inevitable discovery cases for three 
reasons:  (1) the lower deterrent value of the preponderance of the evidence standard 
results in a greater likelihood of police violations of constitutional rights; (2) the inherently 
speculative nature of the inevitable discovery exception increases the risk of admitting 
evidence that might never have otherwise been discovered through legal means; and (3) 
the defendant’s interest in not having admitted against him evidence obtained as a result of 
unlawful police conduct, outweigh the government’s interest in applying the lower 
standard of proof by a preponderance of the evidence). 
51 See Leslie-Ann Marshall Shelby Webb, Jr., Note, Constitutional Law—The Burger Court's 
Warm Embrace of an Impermissibly Designed Interference with the Sixth Amendment Right to the 
Assistance of Counsel—The Adoption of the Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Exclusionary 
Rule:  Nix v. Williams, 28 HOWARD L. J. 945, 988 (1985).  While not rejecting the inevitable 
discovery exception in all cases, Webb strongly advocated for an increased clear and 
convincing standard of proof, reasoning that, without the heightened burden of proof, 
“‘the officer is better off acting illegally whenever the legal investigation’s chances are 
better than fifty percent, since the better-than-fifty-percent chance will lead to a finding of 
inevitable discovery.’”  Id. at 990.  Moreover, Webb argued that the Court’s adoption of a 
lesser standard of proof amounted to an encouragement of constitutional violations by 
police, and that “Chief Justice Burger has openly condoned as well as encouraged. . . [Sixth 
Amendment violations]—so much so, in our opinion, as to elevate the high court from the 
status of a mere ‘accomplice’ to one of ‘co-conspirator’ to such illegal activity.”  Id. at 1003.  
Finally, Webb concluded that “[t]he Supreme Court's warm embrace of such an 
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While much of the criticism directed at the Court was specifically 
aimed at the low standard of proof required by the Court in Nix, many 
commentators were also concerned with the lack of any requirement of 
good faith on the part of the police who engaged in the misconduct at 
issue.52  On the contrary, others have regarded the Court’s rejection of 
any requirement of good faith as remaining true to the logic underlying 
the inevitable discovery doctrine.53 
Although the articles described above have in large part debated the 
wisdom of aspects of the inevitable discovery exception already 
addressed by the United States Supreme Court, many other important 
aspects of the inevitable discovery exception remain unsettled as a 
matter of federal constitutional law, resulting in circuit splits among the 
federal circuits regarding the precise contours of the inevitable discovery 
exception.54  Although the United States Supreme Court has not yet 
                                                                                                             
impermissibly designed interference with [S]ixth [A]mendment rights is an abomination to 
the integrity of our judicial system.”  Id. 
52 See Robert K. Hendrix, The Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Exclusionary Rule:  Nix v. 
Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984), 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1087 (1986) (arguing that the lack of any 
requirement of good faith and the lower standard of proof of a preponderance of the 
evidence would encourage police to engage in illegal conduct during police investigations).  
Hendrix argued that, realistically, the Court's refusal to include a lack of bad faith 
requirement will allow police purposely to violate defendants' rights in the interest of 
accelerating investigations and would work as an open invitation to illegal action.  Id. at 
1096.  Hendrix continued, “[t]he harm to civil rights resulting from the temptation to take 
shortcuts more than outweighs the societal cost of excluding probative evidence under a 
lack of bad faith rule[]” and, furthermore, Hendrix argued that “society has a high interest 
in forcing its government to obey its own laws.”  Id.  With respect to the standard of proof 
by a preponderance, Hendrix argued that “[i]n a situation where a police officer can be 
reasonably sure that evidence will be discovered inevitably, the officer will not be deterred 
by the risk of exclusion because he believes that there is ample evidence to prove inevitable 
discovery by a preponderance of evidence.”  Id. at 1097.  Accordingly, Hendrix believed 
that “the Court's holding in Nix may serve as an incentive to take procedural shortcuts in 
the interest of saving time and effort.”  Id. 
53 See Cohn, supra note 49, at 749 (agreeing with the Court’s rejection in Nix of a good 
faith requirement as “pointless” and “punitive,” reasoning that proof of inevitable 
discovery severs any causal connection between the misconduct and the discovery of the 
challenged evidence and that it makes no sense to invoke a good or bad faith test because 
the mens rea of the offending officer is irrelevant to the question of causation).  In addition, 
Cohn argued that “a ‘good faith’ test would force society to pay for the mistakes of its law 
enforcement officials; because of police infractions, courts would exclude evidence that 
would have been discovered through lawful means, and potentially dangerous criminals 
would escape conviction with impunity.”  Id. at 750. 
54 See Troy E. Golden, The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine Today:  The Demands of the Fourth 
Amendment, Nix, and Murray, and the Disagreement Among the Federal Circuits, 13 BYU J. PUB. 
L. 97, 125 (1998) (observing that the federal circuits have split in three major areas:  (1) 
whether the inevitable discovery exception applies only to derivative evidence (evidence 
that is an unknown indirect future byproduct derived from the misconduct that inevitably 
would have been obtained through legal means) or if it also reaches primary evidence 
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answered the questions that are creating this discord within the federal 
circuits, the fact remains that its answer will not necessarily resolve the 
debate.  Rather, the Court’s answer will only determine the scope of the 
inevitable discovery exception under the federal Constitution; each state 
must independently resolve for itself the various issues when 
determining the formulation of the inevitable discovery exception that is 
appropriate under its respective state constitution. 
C. The Inevitable Discovery Exception and Its Treatment by the States 
Since the Court’s adoption of the inevitable discovery exception to 
the exclusionary rule, virtually every state court to consider the issue has 
adopted the exception under its respective state constitution.55  However, 
the guidelines for applying the inevitable discovery doctrine in those 
states are by no means uniform.56  In fact, the Court’s decision in Nix has 
                                                                                                             
(evidence immediately known and actually obtained directly after the misconduct); (2) 
whether the police may simply rely on the “we could have gotten a warrant excuse” as 
proof that the evidence would have inevitably been discovered or whether the choice to 
disregard the warrant requirement eliminates the applicability of the exception; and (3) 
whether the inevitable discovery exception requires a demonstration that the lawful means 
that made the discovery inevitable were being actively pursued prior to the occurrence of 
the illegal conduct).  Golden argues that the United States Supreme Court should reject the 
majority rule and hold that the inevitable discovery exception does not reach primary 
evidence, and instead confine the reach of the inevitable discovery exception to derivative 
evidence only, or, in the alternative, limit the exception to cases in which the prosecution 
has demonstrated that police were actively pursuing lawful means of obtaining the 
evidence. The court reasoned that to adopt an expansive approach to the inevitable 
discovery exception would have the effect of encouraging police misconduct in violation of 
the basic principles underlying the Fourth Amendment.  See id. at 126.  See also Jessica 
Forbes, The Inevitable Discovery Exception, Primary Evidence, and the Emasculation of the Fourth 
Amendment, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 1221, 1238 (1987) (arguing that the inevitable discovery 
rule already is overboard and that applying it to primary evidence which is a direct 
product of the police illegality would completely undermine the deterrent effect of the 
exclusionary rule.  But see Stephen E. Hessler, Establishing Inevitability Without Active 
Pursuit:  Defining the Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary 
Rule,  99 MICH L. REV. 238, 278 (2000) (arguing against the adoption of the active pursuit 
doctrine as an unsupported extension of the Court’s holding in Nix that operates as a 
formalistic “‘bright-line’ rule ill equipped to address the multiple fact patterns that 
implicate the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule[,]” and arguing in favor of the 
adoption of an “independent circumstances test” that would establish inevitability in the 
absence of active pursuit). 
55 See State v. Flippo, 575 S.E.2d 170, 188 n.23 (W.Va. 2002) (observing that  [o]nly 
[Indiana and Texas] appear to have expressly refused to recognize the inevitable discovery 
rule[,]” and finding “only three states, South Carolina, Vermont, and Wyoming, that 
appear never to have directly addressed the issue of the inevitable discovery rule[.]”).  
56 Id. at 188 (observing, “[i]t has been suggested that ‘[i]n carving out the ‘inevitable 
discovery’ exception . . . courts must use a surgeon’s scalpel and not a meat axe[,]’” (citing 
LAFAVE, supra note 48, at 244); however, “[a] review of judicial opinions reveal that federal 
and state courts have used a ‘scalpel’ and a ‘meat axe’ in carving out guidelines for the 
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itself been the focus of a fair amount of criticism.57  For instance, in Smith 
v. State,58 the Supreme Court of Alaska, considering whether to adopt the 
inevitable discovery doctrine under the Alaska Constitution, noted that 
various scholars, including Professor Wayne R. LaFave, disagree 
concerning the advisability of the inevitable discovery rule.59  Despite the 
                                                                                                             
inevitable discovery rule[]” and that “there is a split of authority among federal and state 
courts on the requirements for establishing the inevitable discovery rule[.]”). 
57 See Jason Liljestrom, Lawful to the World: Protecting the Integrity of the Inevitable 
Discovery Doctrine, 58 HASTINGS L. J. 177, 184 (2006).  Liljestrom observed that  
[s]ince its adoption in Nix, the inevitable discovery doctrine has been 
the subject of a fair amount of criticism.  For example, some argue that 
the relatively low preponderance standard is inappropriate because 
the doctrine necessarily relies on a hypothetical reconstruction of the 
facts.  The Court's explicit rejection of a good faith requirement has 
also raised concerns among legal commentators.  In addition to 
doctrinal criticism, Nix left several questions open for interpretation, 
leading to circuit splits in application.  For instance, the so-called 
‘primary/derivative evidence distinction’ arose because it is unclear if 
the Nix Court meant to restrict the application of the exception to 
derivative evidence only.  Additionally, lower courts are split on 
whether the existence of an active search for the victim in Nix was a 
critical prerequisite (the ‘active pursuit’ requirement).  Despite the 
ongoing criticism and division regarding application of the various 
nuances of the inevitable discovery doctrine, the requirement that the 
hypothetical independent source be lawful is one element that 
appeared quite straightforward.  After all, the Nix Court unequivocally 
mandated that the prosecution rely on ‘lawful means.’  Nevertheless, a 
pair of recent cases has created yet another inter-circuit conflict, and 
has thrust the lawful means requirement to the forefront of the 
inevitable discovery debate.  
Id. at 183–84 (footnotes omitted). 
58 948 P.2d 473 (Alaska 1997). 
59 Id. at 478–79.  Professor LaFave has summarized the various views as 
follows:  
On the one hand, it is said that it “is a valuable, logical and 
constitutional principle,” the continued application of which will not 
“emasculate or blunt the force of the exclusionary rule.”  So the 
argument goes, the “inevitable discovery” test, “if properly 
administered, serves well the raison d'etre of the exclusionary rule by 
denying to the government the use of evidence ‘come at by the 
exploitation of . . . illegality’ and at the same time minimizes the 
opportunity for the defendant to receive an undeserved and socially 
undesirable bonanza.”  Others object that it is “based on conjecture” 
and “can only encourage police shortcuts whenever evidence may be 
more readily obtained by illegal than by legal means,” and thus 
“collides with the fundamental purpose of the exclusionary rule.”  As 
one commentator put it: 
Such a rule is completely at odds with the purpose 
of the exclusionary rule.  If the police will only be 
deprived of that evidence which the defendant can 
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scholarly debate, however, the Smith court concluded that, in its view, 
“the inevitable discovery exception can and should be formulated” so 
that it meets the concerns expressed by critics of the exception.60   
The decision of the Supreme Court of Alaska in Smith is particularly 
instructive because it illustrates some of the ways in which the inevitable 
discovery doctrine can be formulated to effectively balance the interest of 
society in deterring unlawful police conduct and the public interest in 
having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime.61  For example, in 
Smith, the court rejected the majority’s decision in Nix that proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence was sufficient, instead adopting the view 
expressed in Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion that “the prosecution 
should have the burden of proving by a clear and convincing standard of 
proof that the evidence would have been discovered absent the 
illegality.”62  Additionally, the Smith court perceived a need to safeguard 
against the use of the inevitable discovery exception “in cases where 
discovery by legal means was possible, but not truly inevitable.”63  
                                                                                                             
show they would not have been able to obtain had 
they not engaged in the illegality, they will in no 
way be deterred from such conduct; all they will 
stand to lose is what they would not have 
otherwise had and they might gain some 
advantage if something slips by.  Moreover, the 
illegal route is often faster and easier than the 
legally required route. 
Id. (quoting LAFAVE, supra note 48, at 242). 
60 Smith, 948 P.2d at 479 (observing that the inevitable discovery exception is amenable 
to varying formulations and that “many state courts have adopted some form of the 
inevitable discovery exception[]”). 
61 See generally infra notes 62–67 and accompanying text (adopting a version of the 
inevitable discovery doctrine under its state constitution substantially different from that 
adopted by the Supreme Court under the United States Constitution). 
62 Id. at 479 (expressly adopting the view of the Supreme Court of Hawaii, in State v. 
Lopez, 78 Haw. 433, 896 P.2d 889 (Haw. 1995) (applying clear and convincing standard), 
and citing to State v. Garner, 331 N.C. 491, 417 S.E.2d 502, 506 (N.C. 1992) (applying clear 
and convincing standard), and Commonwealth v. O'Connor, 406 Mass. 112, 546 N.E.2d 336, 
340 (Mass. 1989) (holding that inevitability must be “certain as a practical matter[]”).  See 
also R. Bradley Lamberth, The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine: Procedural Safeguards to Ensure 
Inevitability, 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 129, 145 (1988) (stating that courts should adopt “clear and 
convincing” standard to deter police misconduct and diminish chance of courts admitting 
tainted evidence). 
63 Smith, 948 P.2d at 480.  Addressing this concern, the court held:  
The exception should come into play only when the evidence in 
question truly would have been discovered through procedures likely 
to be employed under the circumstances, rather than through unusual 
measures which police would only employ if given the benefit of 
hindsight.  Accordingly, in order to invoke the exception, the 
prosecution “must establish, first, that certain proper and predictable 
investigatory procedures would have been utilized in the case at bar, 
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Finally, recognizing the potential for the inevitable discovery exception 
to encourage police misconduct, the Smith court rejected the majority’s 
holding in Nix that proof of the absence of bad faith is not required and, 
instead, adopted the view of the Supreme Court of North Dakota64 that 
the inevitable discovery exception should not be available where the 
police have acted in bad faith.65  
Ultimately, the Smith court held that “if the prosecution can show, by 
clear and convincing evidence, that illegally obtained evidence would 
have been discovered through predictable investigative processes, such 
evidence need not be suppressed as long as the police have not 
knowingly or intentionally violated the rights of the accused in obtaining 
that evidence.”66  Although, as recognized in Smith, it is a serious matter 
when a law enforcement officer has intentionally violated the 
constitution that he or she has sworn to uphold, other courts have 
rejected a rule barring application of the inevitable discovery exception 
where the offending officer has acted in bad faith, recognizing instead 
that the good or bad faith of the offending officer is irrelevant to the 
inevitable discovery analysis and that such bad faith misconduct on the 
part of individual officers in inevitable discovery cases is properly 
punishable through mechanisms other than the exclusionary rule.67   
                                                                                                             
and second, that those procedures would have inevitably resulted in 
the discovery of the evidence in question.” 
Id. (citation omitted). 
64 See State v. Phelps, 297 N.W.2d 769, 775 (N.D. 1980) (holding that the inevitable 
discovery exception cannot be used in instances “where it is clear that the police acted in 
bad faith in order to accelerate the discovery of the evidence in question[]”). 
65 948 P.2d at 481.  Accordingly, the Smith court expressly held “that the exception 
should not be available in cases where the police have intentionally or knowingly violated 
a suspect’s rights.”  Id. 
66 Id.  “Taken together,” the court reasoned, “the safeguards outlined above should 
ensure that the adoption of the inevitable discovery exception does not provide an 
opportunity for the prosecution to benefit from illegal activity.”  Id. 
67 See, e.g., Nix, 467 U.S. at 445 (rejecting a good faith requirement, reasoning that a good 
faith requirement would on occasion result in the suppression of evidence that would have 
inevitably been discovered by lawful means, finding that such a result “wholly fails to take 
into account the enormous societal cost of excluding truth in the search for truth in the 
administration of justice,” and that “[n]othing in this Court’s prior holdings supports any 
such formalistic, pointless, and punitive approach[]”); State v. Garner, 331 N.C. 491, 507, 
417 S.E.2d 502, 511 (N.C. 1992) holding that 
[i]f the State finds itself in any situation where it must prove that the 
evidence inevitably would have been discovered by other legal, 
independent means, and it fails to do so, the doctrine is not applied 
and the evidence is suppressed.  This risk of suppression inherently 
preserves the deterrence value of the exclusionary rule.  Further, if the 
State carries its burden and proves inevitable discovery by separate, 
independent means, thus leaving the State in no better and no worse 
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In State v. Flippo,68 the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia 
provided another example of how a state may restrict the scope of the 
inevitable discovery exception so as to reduce the risk that the exception 
will be abused by police.  Specifically, the court considered whether the 
inevitable discovery exception, under West Virginia law, should require 
the prosecution to demonstrate that the police officers were actively 
pursuing the lawful means that would have inevitably led to the 
discovery of the illegally obtained evidence.69  Adopting a restricted 
formulation of the inevitable discovery exception, the court reasoned 
that “[i]f police are allowed to search when they possess no lawful means 
and are only required to show that lawful means could have been 
available even though not pursued, the narrow ‘inevitable discovery’ 
exception would ‘swallow’ the [constitutional warrant] protection.”70 
                                                                                                             
position, any question of good faith, bad faith, mistake or inadvertence 
is simply irrelevant. 
Id.; see also Cantrell v. Morris, 849 N.E.2d 488, 506 n.26 (Ind. 2006) (citing Carey v. Piphus, 
435 U.S. 247, 253 (1978) (observing that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a species of tort liability 
against police officers of local government in favor of persons who have been deprived of 
their federal constitutional rights); McNabola v. Chicago Transit Auth., 10 F.3d 501, 513 
(7th Cir.1993) (holding that to prevail under a section 1983 claim, the plaintiff must 
establish:  (1) he had a constitutionally protected right; (2) he was deprived of that right in 
violation of the Constitution; (3) the defendant(s) intentionally caused that deprivation; and 
(4) the defendant(s) acted under color of state law); see also, e.g., Kucenko v. Marion County 
Sheriff, 2007 WL 1650939 (S.D. Ind. 2007) (observing that although the Indiana Supreme 
Court has not yet recognized a private cause of action for violations by law enforcement 
officers of Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, the Indiana Supreme Court 
explained in Cantrell, 849 N.E.2d at 498, that there is no need to create a new implied cause 
of action under the Indiana Constitution when existing tort law amply protects a right 
guaranteed by the Indiana Constitution).  In Kucenko, Kucenko alleged that sheriff’s 
deputies, responding to an accidental 911 call made by Kucenko, had unlawfully entered 
and searched his apartment without a warrant and unlawfully detained him in handcuffs 
during the search.  2007 WL 1650939 at 1–2.  The district court granted the State’s Motion 
for Summary Judgment on Kucenko’s claims under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana 
Constitution, but denied the State’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Kucenko’s state law 
tort claims for trespass and false arrest.  Id. at 11. 
68 212 W. Va. 560, 580, 575 S.E.2d 170, 189 (W. Va. 2002). 
69 Id. at 579, 189.  The court noted that a minority of federal and state courts take the 
position that the parameters of the inevitable discovery rule should not be so broad as to 
legitimize an unlawful seizure of evidence, merely because the police subsequently 
obtained, or could have obtained, a search warrant that would have led to the ultimate 
seizure of that evidence.  Id.  On the contrary, the court found that a majority of federal and 
state courts apply a broad scope for the inevitable discovery rule, by not requiring the 
police to have initiated lawful means to acquire evidence prior to its seizure.  Id.  Rejecting 
the majority approach, the court reasoned that the minority view is consistent with the 
stringent warrant requirement under article III, section 6 of West Virginia’s Constitution.  
Id. at 580, 190. 
70 Id. at 580, 190 (citing State v. Hatton, 389 N.W.2d 229, 234 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)).  The 
court held that in order for the State,  
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The decision of the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Stith71 
provides yet another example of a case in which a state court recognized 
a limited version of the inevitable discovery exception.  In Stith, the New 
York Court of Appeals distinguished between primary evidence and 
derivative evidence and held that, although the inevitable discovery 
exception applies to derivative evidence, it does not save primary 
evidence from suppression because of the danger that such application 
of the exception might encourage bad faith conduct on the part of the 
police.72 
Cases such as Smith, Flippo, and Stith illustrate the ability of state 
courts to adopt vastly differing forms of the inevitable discovery 
doctrine so as to ensure the protection of constitutional rights without 
                                                                                                             
to prevail under the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary 
rule, Article III, Section 6 of the West Virginia Constitution requires the 
State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that there was a 
reasonable probability that the evidence would have been discovered 
by lawful means in the absence of police misconduct; (2) that the leads 
making the discovery inevitable were possessed by the police at the 
time of the misconduct; and (3) that the police were actively pursuing a 
lawful alternative line of investigation to seize the evidence prior to the 
time of the misconduct. 
Id. at 190–91.  But see United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736 (1st Cir. 1986).  In an opinion 
joined by then Judge, now Justice, Breyer, the First Circuit rejected a requirement of active 
pursuit, reasoning as follows: 
Rather than setting up an inflexible “ongoing” test such as the Fifth 
Circuit's, we suggest that the analysis focus on the questions of 
independence and inevitability and remain flexible enough to handle 
the many different fact patterns which will be presented.  A Nix-like 
case may well require that active pursuit of the investigation be 
underway to satisfy the test of inevitability and independence.  This 
requirement may also be appropriate in illegal search cases where no 
warrant is ever obtained.  In cases where a warrant is obtained, 
however, the active pursuit requirement is too rigid.  On the other 
hand, a requirement that probable cause be present prior to the illegal 
search ensures both independence and inevitability for the prewarrant 
search situation. 
Id. at 746.  The court then concluded that there is no necessary requirement that the warrant 
application process have already been initiated at the time the illegal search took place.  Id. 
71 69 N.Y.2d 313, 506 N.E.2d 911 (N.Y. 1987). 
72 Id. at 318, 913–14.  In Stith, the court defined primary evidence as evidence obtained 
during or as an immediate consequence of the illegal search and derivative evidence as 
“evidence obtained indirectly as a result of leads or information gained from that primary 
evidence.”  Id.  In rejecting the application of the inevitable discovery exception to primary 
evidence, the court reasoned that failing to exclude wrongfully obtained primary evidence 
would be an unacceptable dilution of the exclusionary rule that would encourage unlawful 
searches in the hope that probable cause would be developed after the fact.  Id. at 319–20, 
914. 
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unnecessarily expanding the scope of the exclusionary rule.73  The State 
of Indiana, however, in Ammons v. State,74 became only the second state 
to categorically reject application of the inevitable discovery exception 
under any circumstances.75  In one sweeping statement, with no analysis 
of the varying forms in which the inevitable discovery exception might 
be adopted, the Indiana Court of Appeals categorically rejected the 
inevitable discovery doctrine as an exception to the exclusionary rule 
under the Indiana Constitution.76 
                                                 
73 See generally supra notes 55–72 (highlighting the varying formulations of the inevitable 
discovery exception, including the ability of state courts to raise the burden of proof to 
clear and convincing evidence, require the absence of bad faith, bar application of the 
exception to primary evidence, and require proof of active pursuit or that proper 
investigative procedures would have been utilized in the case at issue).  For additional 
examples of cases in which state courts have adopted variations of the inevitable discovery 
doctrine that differ from that adopted by the Supreme Court in Nix, see Fain v. State, 271 
Ark. 874, 611 S.W.2d 508 (Ark. 1981) (requiring clear and convincing evidence and proof of 
the absence of bad faith); Commonwealth v. O'Connor, 406 Mass. 112, 546 N.E.2d 336 
(Mass. 1989) (rejecting application of the inevitable discovery doctrine to evidence obtained 
in bad faith); State v. Sugar, 100 N.J. 214, 495 A.2d 90 (N.J. 1985) (requiring clear and 
convincing evidence); People v. Turriago, 90 N.Y.2d 77, 87, 681 N.E.2d 350, 354 (N.Y. 1997) 
(requiring proof of “very high degree of probability” that evidence would have inevitably 
been discovered); State v. Reyes, 98 Wn. App. 923, 993 P.2d 921 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) 
(rejecting application of the inevitable discovery doctrine in cases in which the police acted 
unreasonably or to accelerate discovery of the evidence). 
74 770 N.E.2d 927 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).   
75 Id. at 935.  See State v. Flippo, 575 S.E.2d 170, 188 n.23 (W. Va. 2002) (observing, “[o]nly 
[Indiana and Texas] appear to have expressly refused to recognize the inevitable discovery 
rule[]” and finding “only three states, South Carolina, Vermont, and Wyoming, that appear 
never to have directly addressed the issue of the inevitable discovery rule[]”).  Prior to the 
rejection of the inevitable discovery exception by the Indiana Court of Appeals in Ammons, 
the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, in State v. Daugherty, 931 S.W.2d 268, 273 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1996), rejected the inevitable discovery exception, reasoning that TEX. CODE 
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23(a) (2006), which provides:  
‘No evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of any 
provisions of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or of the 
Constitution or laws of the United States of America, shall be admitted 
in evidence against the accused on the trial of any criminal case.’  
did not accommodate an inevitable discovery exception.  Id. at 269, 275.  However, four 
judges dissented from the majority’s rejection of the inevitable discovery exception, 
arguing that the inevitable discovery doctrine legally breaks the causal connection between 
the constitutional violation and the acquisition of the evidence and that “while the 
evidence may have been initially obtained illegally, it is admissible only if the State can show, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would have been inevitably obtained by legal means.”  
Id. at 284. 
76 Ammons, 770 N.E.2d at 935.  In refusing to recognize the inevitable discovery 
exception under the Indiana Constitution, the Indiana Court of Appeals explained as 
follows: 
Under the Fourth Amendment, the inevitable discovery exception to 
the exclusionary rule “permits the introduction of evidence that 
eventually would have been located had there been no error, for in that 
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As the Indiana Court of Appeals correctly noted, the inevitable 
discovery doctrine has never been adopted as a matter of Indiana 
constitutional law.77  However, citing to Brown v. State,78 the Court of 
                                                                                                             
instance ‘there is no nexus sufficient to provide a taint.’”  Shultz v. 
State, 742 N.E.2d at 965 (quoting Banks v. State, 681 N.E.2d 235, 239 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 438, 104 S. 
Ct. 2501, 81 L. Ed. 2d 377 (1984))).  However, the inevitable discovery 
exception has not been adopted as a matter of Indiana constitutional 
law.  Shultz, 742 N.E.2d at 966 n.1.  Our state supreme court has 
previously held that “our state constitution mandates that the evidence 
found as a result of [an unconstitutional] search be suppressed.”  Id. 
(quoting Brown v. State, 653 N.E.2d at 80).  In light of this clear 
language we are not inclined to adopt the inevitable discovery rule as a 
matter of Indiana constitutional law.  Accordingly, the inevitable 
discovery doctrine is not available to validate the evidence of cocaine 
recovered from Ammons’ person as a result of Officer Stout’s 
unjustified pat-down. 
Id.  Although the court of appeals determined that the Indiana Supreme Court’s statement 
in Brown foreclosed any application of the inevitable discovery exception under the Indiana 
Constitution, Brown explicitly addressed only a single issue:  whether the appellant was 
denied his right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of 
Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, or in violation of the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, when the trial court admitted 
evidence obtained in a warrantless search of appellant's car.  Brown v. State, 653 N.E.2d 77, 
80 (Ind. 1995).  After determining that the search of the defendant’s car was unreasonable, 
the Indiana Supreme Court held that the evidence must be suppressed, reasoning that “our 
state constitution mandates that the evidence found as a result of such a search be 
suppressed.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Importantly, however, the Supreme Court expressly 
limited its holding in Brown to require only that evidence found as a result of an unreasonable 
search be suppressed.  Id.  In the haste of the court of appeals in Ammons to reject the 
inevitable discovery exception as a matter of Indiana constitutional law, the court 
misunderstood the basic logic underlying the inevitable discovery exception—that “the 
illegality is not the cause of discovery at all, for [c]onduct is not a legal cause of an event if 
the event would have occurred without it,” and failed to recognize that the inevitable 
discovery exception is wholly consistent with the Indiana Supreme Court’s recitation of the 
general rule that evidence obtained as the result of an unreasonable search must be 
suppressed.   See Cohn, supra note 53 (explaining that proof of inevitable discovery severs 
the causal link between the unlawful conduct and the discovery of the evidence). 
77 Ammons, 770 N.E.2d at 935.  Although the inevitable discovery exception has never 
been adopted as a matter of Indiana constitutional law, it has been applied by Indiana 
courts in several cases in which the defendant has challenged evidence under the Fourth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  See, e.g., LaMunion v. State, 740 N.E.2d 576 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2000); Banks v. State, 681 N.E.2d 235 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997); Jorgensen v. State, 526 
N.E.2d 1004 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988).  In LaMunion, the Indiana Court of Appeals, interpreting 
the inevitable discovery exception under federal law, expressly held that the exception 
does not apply to primary evidence.  740 N.E.2d at 581 (citing Jorgensen, 526 N.E.2d at 
1008).  In Jorgensen, the court of appeals rejected the State’s argument that the unlawfully 
obtained evidence would inevitably have been discovered by lawful means because “the 
police could have secured the premises and obtained a search warrant[,]” reasoning, 
“[w]ere this the rule, no warrantless search supported by probable cause would be 
invalid.”  526 N.E.2d at 1008.  Neither the Indiana Supreme Court nor the United States 
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Appeals, in Ammons, interpreted a single sentence within an opinion of 
the Indiana Supreme Court in a case that did not involve the inevitable 
discovery doctrine, as forever rejecting the inevitable discovery 
exception as violative of Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, 
regardless of its form or the circumstances of the case.79  The statement of 
the Indiana Supreme Court so heavily relied upon by the Court of 
Appeals, however, enunciates only the general rule that evidence 
obtained as a result of police misconduct must be excluded and is 
strikingly similar to general statements of the United States Supreme 
Court regarding the exclusionary rule which has never been interpreted 
as, without exception, requiring the exclusion of all evidence obtained as 
a result of police misconduct.80 
In December of 2002, in a 3-2 decision, the Supreme Court of Indiana 
denied transfer in Ammons and left standing the blanket rejection by the 
Indiana Court of Appeals of the inevitable discovery doctrine under the 
                                                                                                             
Supreme Court has ever ruled on the applicability of the inevitable discovery exception to 
primary evidence and there presently exists a split among the federal circuits as to whether 
any distinction between primary and derivative evidence is appropriate.  See Troy E. 
Golden, The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine Today:  The Demands of the Fourth Amendment, Nix, 
and Murray, and the Disagreement Among the Federal Circuits’, 13 BYU J. PUB. L. 97, 125 (1998).  
See infra Part III.C (discussing the appropriateness of a distinction between primary and 
derivative evidence in inevitable discovery cases). 
78 653 N.E.2d at 80. 
79 See Ammons, 770 N.E.2d at 935 (interpreting the Indiana Supreme Court’s statement in 
Brown, 653 N.E.2d at 80, that “‘our state constitution mandates that the evidence found as a 
result of [an unconstitutional] search be suppressed[,]’” as mandating that the inevitable 
discovery exception be rejected as a matter of Indiana constitutional law).  Applying its 
unprecedented decision to the facts in Ammons, the Indiana Court of Appeals concluded:   
Officer Stout performed an illegal pat-down of Ammons.  However, 
prior to the illegal pat-down, Ammons voluntarily consented to a 
search of his car, which rendered Officer Clark’s search of Ammons’ 
vehicle and recovery of his handgun legal.  Nevertheless, because we 
hold that the inevitable discovery rule is not applicable under Article 1, 
Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, the cocaine recovered from 
Ammons’ person remains suppressed.  In sum, the trial court is 
instructed to grant Ammons’ motion to suppress the cocaine but deny 
his motion in regards to the handgun. 
Id. 
80 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding, “all evidence obtained by searches 
and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a 
state court[]”) (emphasis added).  But see United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 275 (1978) 
(observing that the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the 
introduction of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons; instead, 
“[r]ecognizing not only the benefits but the costs, which are often substantial, of the 
exclusionary rule[] . . . application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its 
remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served[]”). 
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Indiana Constitution.81  Until the Supreme Court of Indiana squarely 
addresses the issue, the decision of the Indiana Court of Appeals will 
remain an anomaly in inevitable discovery jurisprudence, and the future 
of the inevitable discovery doctrine in Indiana, in any form, will remain 
nonexistent.   
III.  ANALYSIS:  THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE VARIOUS 
FORMULATIONS 
More than two decades after the Supreme Court’s decision in Nix v. 
Williams adopting the inevitable discovery exception as a matter of 
federal constitutional law, there remains strong disagreement concerning 
the appropriate guidelines for applying the exception.82  Although there 
has been significant criticism of the form of the inevitable discovery 
exception adopted by the Court in Nix, the arguments of the critics 
generally are directed not at the exception itself, but rather at the manner 
in which the exception often is applied.83  In fact, with the exceptions of 
Texas and Indiana, the inevitable discovery doctrine has been 
universally accepted in one form or another by every state to consider 
the issue.84  While it is true that the states generally agree that the 
inevitable discovery doctrine is a permissible exception to the 
exclusionary rule, states have often disagreed as to the appropriate 
restrictions to attach to the rule.85 
Presently, much of the debate concerning the inevitable discovery 
exception has primarily centered on the standard of proof that must be 
                                                 
81 See Ammons v. State, 783 N.E.2d 704 (Ind. 2002).  See also Joel Schumm, Year-End 
Decisions Bring Clarity and Need for Clarification, 46 RES. GES. 38, 40 (March 2003).  Schumm 
observed that, after hearing oral argument on the State's petition to transfer in Ammons, 
which asked the Indiana Supreme Court to recognize the federal inevitable discovery 
exception to the exclusionary rule as a matter of Indiana constitutional law, the Supreme 
Court denied transfer by a narrow 3-2 vote.  Id.  Justice Sullivan and Justice Boehm voted to 
grant a transfer.  Id. at 40 n.2.  Schumm further explained, “[a]lthough the close vote 
suggests that the issue might later resurface, for the time being the protections afforded 
under Article I, Section 11 remain greater than those of the Fourth Amendment, at least in 
this regard.”  Id. 
82 See generally supra Part II.B and accompanying text (discussing the varying opinions of 
legal commentators concerning the proper scope of the inevitable discovery exception); 
Part II.C and accompanying text (discussing the varying formulations of the inevitable 
discovery doctrine adopted by the states). 
83 See LAFAVE, supra note 48, at 243–44 (suggesting that courts must take care to ensure 
that the inevitable discovery exception is only applied in appropriate cases). 
84 See supra note 55 (observing that only Indiana and Texas appear to have expressly 
refused to recognize the inevitable discovery rule and finding that only three states appear 
never to have directly addressed the issue of the inevitable discovery rule). 
85 See generally supra Part II.C and accompanying text (describing some of the varying 
formulations adopted by the states). 
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satisfied by the prosecution to prove that illegally obtained evidence 
would inevitably have been discovered by lawful means, and also 
whether there should be a requirement that the police were acting in 
good faith at the time of the constitutional violation.86  Additionally, 
much debate has focused on whether the inevitable discovery exception 
should apply to both primary evidence and derivative evidence.87  
Finally, many courts have struggled with whether it should be required 
that the police were actively pursuing the lawful means that would have 
led to the inevitable discovery of the illegally obtained evidence at the 
time of the constitutional violation, and whether the inevitable discovery 
exception should be applicable in cases in which the police had not yet 
applied for a warrant, but had probable cause and could have obtained a 
warrant.88  Part III.A of this Note discusses the logic underlying the 
inevitable discovery exception and why this logic demands a standard of 
clear and convincing evidence in inevitable discovery cases.89  Part III.B 
illustrates the irrelevance of a requirement of good faith in inevitable 
discovery cases.90  Next, Part III.C illustrates the need to apply the 
exception not only to derivative evidence, but to primary evidence as 
well.91  Finally, Part III.D identifies the appropriate scope of the “active 
pursuit rule” and the “could have obtained a warrant” excuse, so as to 
deter police misconduct while not unduly interfering with police 
investigative procedures.92   
A. The Inevitable Discovery Exception and the Appropriate Burden of Proof 
As previously explained in Part II, the exclusionary rule serves the 
following two dominant functions:  (1) to deter lawless conduct by law 
enforcement authorities and (2) to close the courthouse doors to the 
                                                 
86 See supra Part III.A and accompanying text (highlighting various arguments for and 
against a heightened standard of proof and a requirement of good faith). 
87 See supra note 54 (discussing the split among the federal circuit courts of appeals as to 
whether the inevitable discovery exception is applicable to primary evidence).  See also 
supra note 77 (discussing two decisions of the Indiana Court of Appeals, applying federal 
law, holding that the inevitable discovery exception is inapplicable to primary evidence). 
88 See supra Part III.C and accompanying text (discussing various arguments for and 
against the requirement of “active pursuit” or the acceptability of the “could have obtained 
a warrant excuse”). 
89 See infra Part III.A (analyzing the arguments for and against a requirement of clear 
and convincing evidence in inevitable discovery cases). 
90 See infra Part III.B (analyzing the relevance of a requirement of good faith in inevitable 
discovery cases). 
91 See infra Part III.C (analyzing the appropriateness of a distinction between primary 
and derivative evidence in inevitable discovery cases). 
92 See infra Part III.D (analyzing the requirement that police would (rather than merely 
could) have obtained the challenged evidence in inevitable discovery cases). 
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admission of illegally obtained evidence.93  However, recognizing not 
only the benefits but also the substantial costs of the exclusionary rule, 
courts have restricted application of the rule to those areas where its 
remedial objectives are likely most efficaciously served.94  The inevitable 
discovery exception is one example of such an occasion where “the 
deterrence rationale [of the exclusionary rule] has so little basis that the 
evidence should be received.”95   
In order that courts may properly determine the appropriate 
contours of the inevitable discovery exception, courts must not lose sight 
of the basic rationale underlying the exception—unlawful police conduct 
is not the cause of the discovery of the evidence if the evidence would 
have been discovered without any reference to the illegality.96  This logic 
is sound, however, only if a thorough examination of the facts of the case 
reveals that the evidence indeed would have been discovered regardless 
of the misconduct of the police.97   
                                                 
93 See supra note 42 and accompanying text (explaining that the exclusionary rule 
effectuates its deterrence rationale by eliminating the fruits of unlawful police conduct and 
that the exclusionary rule preserves the integrity and fairness of judicial proceedings 
through the closure of the courthouse doors to the admission of unlawfully obtained 
evidence).  See also supra note 23 and accompanying text (explaining that the exclusionary 
rule was adopted by the Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391–92 
(1914), as a necessary tool to ensure that constitutional prohibitions are respected and that 
constitutional rights are protected). 
94 See supra note 28 and accompanying text (observing that the exclusionary rule has 
never been interpreted so broadly as to require the exclusion of all evidence illegally seized 
in all proceedings against all persons).  See also supra note 30 (explaining that the 
exclusionary rule has become riddled with exceptions so as to ensure that the exclusionary 
rule is only applicable where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs). 
95 Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 432, 444 (1984) (holding that “[i]f the prosecution can 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably 
would have been discovered by lawful means[] . . . []then the deterrence rationale has so 
little basis that the evidence should be received” and that “[a]nything less would reject 
logic, experience, and common sense.”) (internal footnote omitted).  See also supra note 41 
and accompanying text (explaining that the exclusion of evidence that would have 
inevitably been discovered without any reference to illegal conduct “wholly fails to take 
into account the enormous societal cost of excluding truth in the search for truth in the 
administration of justice[]”). 
96 See supra note 49 (discussing Cohn’s perspective:  Cohn agreed with the Court in Nix 
that the inevitable discovery exception should be adopted, but disagreed with the Court’s 
acceptance of proof by a preponderance of the evidence as the appropriate standard in 
inevitable discovery cases). 
97 See supra note 49 (suggesting that clear and convincing evidence is the appropriate 
standard of proof in inevitable discovery cases and arguing that a spotty and imprecise 
treatment of the facts, as may occur under a standard of proof merely by a preponderance 
of the evidence, leads to a mechanical application of the rule that detracts from the logic 
that determines its validity). 
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Unlike the independent source exception, which allows the 
prosecution to introduce evidence only if it was, in fact, obtained by 
lawful means, the inevitable discovery exception allows the introduction 
of evidence that has not actually been obtained from an independent 
source, but rather would have been discovered as a matter of course if 
independent investigations were allowed to proceed.98  In Justice 
Brennan’s opinion, “this distinction should require that the government 
satisfy a heightened burden of proof before it is allowed to use such 
evidence.”99   
Although the Court in Nix adopted a standard of proof by a mere 
preponderance of the evidence, Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion, 
which would require the prosecution to present clear and convincing 
evidence of inevitable discovery, has widely been accepted by state 
courts in the years since Nix as necessary to deter abuse of the inevitable 
discovery exception and to ensure continued protection of the 
fundamental rights that the exclusionary rule so importantly protects.100  
State courts that have adopted the clear and convincing standard of 
proof have recognized that the exclusionary rule ordinarily requires the 
suppression of the fruits of police misconduct and that any departure 
from this established rule under the guise of inevitable discovery should 
require clear and convincing proof that the evidence, in fact, would have 
been discovered without the illegality. 
The legitimacy of the inevitable discovery exception depends on the 
severance of the causal link between the police misconduct and the 
discovery of the evidence and, therefore, it does not pose an unfair 
burden on the state to require the state to prove by clear and convincing 
                                                 
98 See Nix, 467 U.S. at 459.  Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissenting from 
the Court’s adoption of the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof, argued that 
the speculative nature of the inquiry into whether the evidence truly would inevitably have 
been discovered by lawful means requires the adoption of a clear and convincing evidence 
standard.  Id. 
99 Id. at 459 (arguing that raising the burden of proof to clear and convincing evidence 
also serves to impress upon the fact-finder the importance of the decision and thereby 
reduces the risk that illegally obtained evidence will be admitted). 
100 See generally supra note 62 (providing examples of state courts that require proof by 
clear and convincing evidence in inevitable discovery cases).  See also supra notes 49–52 and 
accompanying text (providing examples of articles in which legal commentators have 
argued that a standard of clear and convincing evidence is necessary for the proper 
application of the inevitable discovery exception).  See also Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 n.5 
(emphasizing that “inevitable discovery involves no speculative elements but focuses on 
demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification or impeachment and does not 
require a departure from the usual burden of proof at suppression hearings[]”).  But see 
supra note 50 and accompanying text (arguing that the inherently speculative nature of the 
inevitable discovery exception increases the risk of admitting evidence that may not have 
been discovered through legal means). 
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evidence that the discovery of the evidence was indeed inevitable.101  If it 
is not clear that the illegally obtained evidence would have inevitably 
been discovered through lawful means, then the logic underlying the 
inevitable discovery exception—that unlawful police conduct was not 
the legal cause of the discovery of the evidence if the evidence would 
have been discovered without reference to the illegality—fails for the 
simple reason that the sole cause of discovery, then, is the illegality.102  
Thus, the very logic of the inevitable discovery exception demands not 
merely that it is more likely than not that the evidence could have been 
discovered; it demands clear and convincing evidence that the evidence 
inevitably would have been discovered.103   
Other concerns further illustrate the need to utilize a heightened 
standard of proof in inevitable discovery cases.  One such concern is that 
the lower deterrent value of the preponderance of the evidence standard 
results in a greater likelihood of police violations of constitutional 
rights.104  Of course, the incentive to abuse the inevitable discovery 
exception could be eliminated simply by implementing a requirement 
that the police act in good faith in inevitable discovery cases.105  
                                                 
101 See supra note 62 (providing examples of state courts holding that inevitability must be 
“certain as a practical matter[]” and that courts should adopt the clear and convincing 
standard to deter police misconduct and diminish chance of courts admitting tainted 
evidence).  Com. v. O’Connor, 546 N.E.2d 336, 340 (Mass. 1989). 
102 Cohn, supra note 49, at 752 (footnote omitted) (arguing that “[r]equiring the 
prosecution to present clear and convincing evidence of inevitable discovery before 
concluding that the prosecution has met its burden of proof would deter judicial abuse of a 
valuable exception to the exclusionary rule and would protect the fundamental rights that 
the rule guarantees[]”). 
103 See supra note 63 and accompanying text (providing an example of a state court 
rejecting any argument that it is sufficient in inevitable discovery cases—that the evidence 
merely could have been discovered by lawful means—and requiring proof by clear and 
convincing evidence that the challenged evidence would have been obtained by lawful 
means). 
104 Hendrix, supra note 52, at 1097 (arguing that “[i]n a situation where a police officer can 
be reasonably sure that evidence will be discovered inevitably, the officer will not be 
deterred by the risk of exclusion because he believes that there is ample evidence to prove 
inevitable discovery by a preponderance of evidence[]”).  See also Webb, supra note 51, at 
990 (footnote omitted) (arguing that “the officer is better off acting illegally whenever the 
legal investigation’s chances are better than fifty percent, since the better-than-fifty-percent 
chance will lead to a finding of inevitable discovery[]”). 
105 See Hendrix, supra note 52, at 1096 (arguing that “[t]he harm to civil rights resulting 
from the temptation to take shortcuts more than outweighs the societal cost of excluding 
probative evidence under a lack of bad faith rule[]” and that “society has a high interest in 
forcing its government to obey its own laws[]”).  Smith v. State, 948 P.2d 473, 481 (Alaska 
1997).  See also supra notes 58–67 (providing an example of a state court decision holding 
that the inevitable discovery “exception should not be available in cases where the police 
have intentionally or knowingly violated a suspect's rights[]”); see also supra note 73 
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However, for reasons to be more fully explored in Part III.B, a good faith 
requirement has been largely rejected as irrelevant under inevitable 
discovery analysis.106  The point, however, is that without the 
implementation of a good faith requirement, the need for a heightened 
burden of proof to prevent abuse of the inevitable discovery exception 
becomes even more apparent.107 
In sum, the inevitable discovery doctrine is a logical exception to the 
exclusionary rule; however, the exception retains its logic only when it 
can clearly and convincingly be shown that the evidence would inevitably 
have been obtained by lawful means.108  The failure of the prosecution to 
satisfy the burden of clear and convincing evidence is tantamount to 
failing to prove that the evidence indeed, inevitably, would have been 
discovered by lawful means; thus, in such cases, the logic underlying the 
inevitable discovery exception fails for the simple reason that the 
illegality then is the exclusive cause of the discovery of the challenged 
evidence.109  Accordingly, a standard of clear and convincing evidence is 
necessary to preserve the logic that determines the validity of the 
inevitable discovery exception.110 
                                                                                                             
(providing additional examples of state court decisions requiring proof of the absence of 
bad faith in inevitable discovery cases). 
106 See Cohn, supra note 49, at 749 (explaining that proof of inevitable discovery severs 
any causal connection between the misconduct and the discovery of the evidence and that 
it makes no sense to invoke a good or bad faith test because the mens rea of the offending 
officer is irrelevant to the question of causation).  See also Nix, 467 U.S. at 445 (1984).  In Nix, 
the Court unanimously rejected a good faith requirement, with the majority reasoning that 
a good faith requirement would on occasion result in the suppression of evidence that 
would inevitably have been discovered by lawful means.  Id.  The Court concluded that 
such a result “wholly fails to take into account the enormous societal cost of excluding 
truth in the search for truth in the administration of justice[]” and that “[n]othing in this 
Court’s prior holdings supports any such formalistic, pointless, and punitive approach.”  
Id. 
107 See Cohn, supra note 49, at 752 (arguing that “[r]equiring the prosecution to present 
clear and convincing evidence of inevitable discovery before concluding that the 
prosecution has met its burden of proof would deter judicial abuse of a valuable exception 
to the exclusionary rule and would protect the fundamental rights that the rule 
guarantees[]”). 
108 See id. (arguing that unlawful conduct is not the legal cause of the discovery of the 
challenged evidence only if the event would have been discovered regardless of the 
unlawful conduct). 
109 See id. at 750 (arguing that, in any case in which the inevitable discovery rule is 
applicable, the court must examine thoroughly the facts of the case before the rule is 
introduced in order to determine if the evidence indeed would have been discovered 
regardless of the police misconduct and further arguing that “[a] spotty and imprecise 
treatment of the facts[] . . . leads to a mechanical application of the rule and detracts from 
the logic that determines its validity[]”).   
110 See Fishkin, supra note 50 (arguing that:  (1) the lower deterrent value of the 
preponderance of the evidence standard results in a greater likelihood of police violations 
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B. The Inevitable Discovery Exception and the Irrelevance of a Good Faith 
Requirement 
In Nix, the Supreme Court unanimously agreed that the inevitable 
discovery exception contains no requirement that the prosecution prove 
the absence of bad faith.111  While the Court provided various 
justifications for its rejection of a good faith requirement, the majority 
failed to discuss one very important reason why consideration of the 
good or bad faith of the offending officer is irrelevant to the inevitable 
discovery analysis—proof of inevitable discovery by lawful means 
severs any causal connection between the misconduct and the discovery 
of the challenged evidence; thus, it makes no sense to invoke a good or 
bad faith test because the mens rea of the offending officer is irrelevant 
to the question of causation.112  Where the prosecution has proven that 
                                                                                                             
of constitutional rights; (2) the inherently speculative nature of the inevitable discovery 
exception increases the risk of admitting evidence that might never have otherwise been 
discovered through legal means; and (3) the defendant’s interest not having admitted 
against him evidence obtained as a result of unlawful police conduct, outweigh the 
government’s interest in applying the lower standard of proof by a preponderance of the 
evidence). 
111 See supra notes 41 and accompanying text (explaining that the societal costs of the 
exclusionary rule far outweigh any possible benefits to deterrence that a good-faith 
requirement might produce).  The Court in Nix, reasoned that “[t]he requirement that the 
prosecution must prove the absence of bad faith. . . would place courts in the position of 
withholding from juries relevant and undoubted truth that would have been available to 
police absent any unlawful activity[,]” placing the police in a worse position than they 
would have obtained if no unlawful conduct had occurred.  467 U.S. at 445.  The Court 
further rejected the argument that a good-faith requirement is necessary to deter unlawful 
police conduct, and further explained that “[a] police officer who is faced with the 
opportunity to obtain evidence illegally will rarely, if ever, be in a position to calculate 
whether the evidence sought would inevitably be discovered[]” and that, if a police officer 
is aware that evidence inevitably will be discovered, he will try to avoid engaging in 
questionable practices because “there will be little to gain from taking any dubious 
‘shortcuts’ to obtain the evidence.”  Id. at 445–46.  Finally, the court explained that “if the 
government can prove that the evidence would have been obtained inevitably and, 
therefore, would have been admitted, regardless of any overreaching by the police, there is 
no rational basis to keep that evidence from the jury in order to ensure the fairness of the 
trial proceedings[]” because, in that situation, “the State has gained no advantage at trial 
and the defendant has suffered no prejudice[;]” because, “suppression of the evidence 
would operate to undermine the adversary system by putting the State in a worse position 
than it would have occupied without any police misconduct.”  Id. at 447. 
112 Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 447 (1984).  The Court explained that  
[a]dmission of the victim’s body, if it inevitably would have been 
discovered anyway, means that the trial in this case was not the 
product of an inquisitorial process; that process was untainted by 
illegality.  The good or bad faith of [the detective]. . . is therefore 
simply irrelevant.  If the trial process was not tainted as a result of his 
conduct, this defendant received the type of trial that the Sixth 
Amendment envisions. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 1 [2008], Art. 9
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss1/9
2008] The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine 439 
the challenged evidence would inevitably have been discovered without 
reference to the unlawful police conduct, the lawful means through 
which the police inevitably would have discovered the evidence, implicit 
in which is always good faith intent, replaces the misconduct as the legal 
cause of the discovery of the challenged evidence.113 
Although the logic of the inevitable discovery exception seemingly 
commands the rejection of a good faith requirement, some courts and 
commentators disagree.114  For instance, in Smith,115 the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                             
Id. (emphasis added); see also supra note 67 (explaining that if the State carries the burden 
and proves inevitable discovery by separate, independent means, thus leaving the State in 
no better and no worse position, any question of good faith, bad faith, mistake or 
inadvertence is simply irrelevant). 
113 See Cohn, supra note 53, at 750 (agreeing with the Court’s rejection in Nix of a good 
faith requirement as “pointless” and “punitive” and arguing that “a ‘good faith’ test would 
force society to pay for the mistakes of its law enforcement officials; because of police 
infractions, courts would exclude evidence that would have been discovered through 
lawful means, and potentially dangerous criminals would escape conviction with 
impunity.”).  See also Part I (describing United States v. Holland, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
14090 (W.D. TN 2003), in which application of a requirement of proof of the absence of bad 
faith may have required the unnecessary and inappropriate exclusion of evidence that 
inevitably would have been obtained by lawful means and without reference to any police 
misconduct).  In United States v. Holland, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14090 (W.D. TN 2003), 
Officer Vaughn had obtained a valid search warrant for the home of Mr. Holland; however, 
prior to having an opportunity to execute the search warrant, two patrol officers responded 
to Mr. Holland’s home in reference to a report of a deceased body in the trunk of a vehicle 
in Mr. Holland’s garage.  Id. at 5–7.  While investigating, the officers testified that they 
smelled a strong odor consistent with the decomposition of human remains emanating 
from the garage and that they observed a vehicle in the garage that matched the type of 
vehicle alleged to contain a deceased body.  Id. at 7–8.  Rather than obtaining a search 
warrant, however, the officers forced entry into Mr. Holland’s garage and searched the 
trunk of the vehicle, wherein they discovered the challenged primary evidence:  the body 
of a murder victim.  Id. at 8–9.  The trial court held that this search was constitutionally 
unreasonable but denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the fruits of the unreasonable 
search because the evidence would have inevitably been discovered by Officer Vaughn 
pursuant to the search warrant that he had obtained and planned to execute in short order.  
Id. at 21–23.  If the law had required the State to prove the absence of bad faith, the court 
may have been required to suppress any evidence of the victim’s body due to the apparent 
disregard by the two patrol officers for Holland’s Fourth Amendment rights regardless of 
the fact that Officer Vaughn, acting in good faith and without reference to the unlawful 
conduct of the patrol officers, would have inevitably discovered the body soon afterward 
pursuant to a validly issued search warrant.  Id. at 23.  In essence, applying the 
exclusionary rule in such a case would require the victim’s family and society as a whole to 
bear the enormous consequences of the overzealousness and indiscretion of the two patrol 
officers without regard for the fact that such misconduct was not, in fact, the legal cause of 
discovery of the victim’s body.  Id.  See supra note 49 (explaining that illegality is not the 
legal cause of the discovery of challenged evidence if the evidence would inevitably have 
been discovered without reference to the illegality). 
114 See Cohn, supra note 52 (arguing that the court’s refusal to include a lack of bad faith 
requirement will allow police to purposely violate defendants’ rights in the interest of 
accelerating investigations and would work as an open invitation to illegal action, and also 
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of Alaska, adopting the view of the Supreme Court of North Dakota,116 
rejected the Court’s decision in Nix that proof of the absence of bad faith 
is not required and held instead that the inevitable discovery exception is 
unavailable in cases in which the police have acted in bad faith.117 
This approach of the Supreme Court of Alaska accepts precisely, 
although much too hastily, the rule recognized by Judge, later Justice, 
Cardozo that “[t]he criminal is to go free because the constable has 
blundered.”118  As the Court wisely, and unanimously, held in Nix, 
“when, as here, the evidence in question would inevitably have been 
discovered without reference to the police error or misconduct, there is 
no nexus sufficient to provide a taint and the evidence is admissible[,]” 
regardless of the constable’s blunder.119  Reflecting back on the basic 
logic of the inevitable discovery exception, the bad faith of the police 
officer who engaged in the misconduct is irrelevant if the prosecution 
can prove that the police would inevitably have obtained the evidence 
through lawful means, implicit in which is always good faith, because, in 
                                                                                                             
arguing that the harm to civil rights resulting from the temptation to take shortcuts, 
coupled with society’s high interest in forcing its government to obey its own laws, more 
than outweighs the societal cost of excluding probative evidence under a lack of bad faith 
rule). 
115 948 P.2d 473 (Alaska 1997).   
116 See State v. Phelps, 297 N.W.2d 769, 775 (N.D. 1980) (holding that the inevitable 
discovery exception cannot be used in instances “where it is clear that the police acted in 
bad faith in order to accelerate the discovery of the evidence in question[]”). 
117 948 P.2d at 481 (reasoning that the inevitable discovery “exception should not be 
available in cases where the police have intentionally or knowingly violated a suspect’s 
rights[]”). 
118 See Nix, 467 U.S. 431, 447, 448 (1984) (quoting People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 
(1926)).  In Nix, the majority noted that Judge, later Justice, Cardozo further considered 
how far-reaching the societal effect of the exclusionary rule would be when, “[the] pettiest 
peace officer would have it in his power through overzeal or indiscretion to confer 
immunity upon an offender for crimes the most flagitious[]”  Id. at 447–48 (quotations 
omitted) (quoting Defore, 150 N.E. at 588).  Even more prophetically, Judge Cardozo 
speculated that some day, “some court might press the exclusionary rule to the outer limits 
of its logic—or beyond—and suppress evidence relating to the ‘body of a murdered’ victim 
because of the means by which it was found.”  Id.  at 448 (citing Defore, 150 N.E. at 588). 
119 See id. at 448.  The court observed that “[t]he requirement that the prosecution must 
prove the absence of bad faith[] . . . would place courts in the position of withholding from 
juries relevant and undoubted truth that would have been available to police absent any 
unlawful activity[]” and that the police would then be placed in a worse position than they 
would have obtained if no unlawful conduct had occurred.  Id. at 445.  The Court further 
unanimously agreed that “the societal costs of the exclusionary rule far outweigh any 
possible benefits to deterrence that a good-faith requirement might produce[]” and that 
“[e]xclusion of physical evidence that would inevitably have been discovered adds nothing 
to either the integrity or fairness of a criminal trial.”  Nix, 467 U.S. at 446.   
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such an instance, it is the lawful means and not the misconduct that 
serves as the legal cause of the discovery of the evidence.120   
Contrary to the view of the Supreme Court of Alaska that proof of 
the absence of bad faith should be required in inevitable discovery cases, 
other states, consistently with the purposes of the exclusionary rule, have 
joined the Supreme Court in rejecting such a requirement.121  As the 
Supreme Court has explained, the exclusionary rule serves two 
dominant functions:  (1) to deter lawless conduct by law enforcement 
officers and (2) to close the doors of the courts to any use of evidence 
unconstitutionally obtained.122  The Court has further explained, 
however, that the interest of society in deterring unlawful police conduct 
and the public interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a 
crime are properly balanced by putting the police in the same, not a 
worse, position than they would have occupied if no police misconduct 
                                                 
120 See, e.g., supra note 53 and accompanying text (arguing that proof of inevitable 
discovery severs any causal connection between the misconduct and the discovery of the 
challenged evidence and that it makes no sense to invoke a good or bad faith test because 
the mens rea of the offending officer is irrelevant to the question of causation).  See also State 
v. Garner, 331 N.C. 491, 507, 417 S.E.2d 502, 511 (N.C. 1992)  (providing an example of a 
state court decision holding that, 
[i]f the State finds itself in any situation where it must prove that the 
evidence inevitably would have been discovered by other legal, 
independent means, and it fails to do so, the doctrine is not applied 
and the evidence is suppressed.  This risk of suppression inherently 
preserves the deterrence value of the exclusionary rule 
and that “if the State carries its burden and proves inevitable discovery by separate, 
independent means, thus leaving the State in no better and no worse position, any question 
of good faith, bad faith, mistake or inadvertence is simply irrelevant”).  See also Nix, 467 
U.S. at 456.  Justice Stevens, concurring with the majority, also rejected any requirement of 
proof of the absence of bad faith on the part of the offending officer, explaining: 
Admission of the victim’s body, if it would have been discovered 
anyway, means that the trial in this case was not the product of an 
inquisitorial process; that process was untainted by illegality.  The 
good or bad faith of [the detective] is therefore simply irrelevant.  If the 
trial process was not tainted as a result of his conduct, this defendant 
received the type of trial that the Sixth Amendment envisions. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
121 See Garner, 331 N.C. at 507, 417 S.E.2d 502, 511 (in which the North Carolina Supreme 
Court rejected a good faith requirement and the argument that the inevitable discovery 
exception encourages police misconduct, reasoning that the ultimate risk of suppression in 
inevitable discovery cases inherently preserves the deterrence value of the exclusionary 
rule and that, if the State carries its burden and proves inevitable discovery by separate, 
independent means, thus leaving the State in no better and no worse position, any question 
of good faith, bad faith, mistake or inadvertence is simply irrelevant). 
122 See generally supra notes 21–31 and accompanying text (describing the development of, 
and justification for, the exclusionary rule). 
Shively: The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine: Indiana as the Exception, Not
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008
442 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
had occurred.123  Therefore, the predominant goal of the exclusionary 
rule is not to punish individual police officers for engaging in 
misconduct but, rather, to ensure the fairness and integrity of criminal 
trials by eliminating any advantage gained by the state through the 
unlawful conduct of its law enforcement officers.124  The inevitable 
discovery exception is, thus, perfectly compatible with the purposes of 
the exclusionary rule:  the exception applies only to evidence that 
inevitably would have been obtained through lawful means and for which 
such lawful means, and not police misconduct, serves as the legal cause 
of discovery.125  On the contrary, a requirement of good faith and its 
punitive consequences would run counter to the purposes of the 
exclusionary rule by bestowing upon defendants an entirely undeserved 
windfall and by removing the police to a position far worse than they 
would have occupied had no misconduct taken place.126 
Although it is a serious matter when a law enforcement officer has 
intentionally violated the constitution that he or she has sworn to 
uphold, a blanket rule barring application of the inevitable discovery 
exception, where the offending officer has acted in bad faith, is 
unwarranted and inappropriate because the good or bad faith of the 
offending officer is irrelevant to the inevitable discovery analysis, and 
such bad faith misconduct on the part of individual officers in inevitable 
discovery cases is properly punishable through mechanisms other than 
the exclusionary rule.127 
                                                 
123 See Nix, 467 U.S. at 446  (explaining that “[e]xclusion of physical evidence that would 
inevitably have been discovered adds nothing to either the integrity or fairness of a 
criminal trial”).  The Court further explained that “[s]uppression, in these circumstances, 
would do nothing whatever to promote the integrity of the trial process, but would inflict a 
wholly unacceptable burden on the administration of criminal justice” and that the 
exclusion of such evidence would do nothing to ensure the fairness of the criminal trial 
because fairness can be ensured merely “by placing the State and the accused in the same 
positions they would have been in had impermissible conduct not taken place.”  Id. at 447. 
124 Id. at 445 (explaining that the exclusion of evidence that inevitably would have been 
discovered without any reference to illegal conduct “wholly fails to take into account the 
enormous societal cost of excluding truth in the search for truth in the administration of 
justice[]” and that “[n]othing in this Court's prior holdings supports any such formalistic, 
pointless, and punitive approach[]”). 
125 See supra note 49 (explaining that unlawful conduct is not the legal cause of the 
discovery of evidence if the evidence would inevitably been discovered without any 
reference to the illegality). 
126 See supra note 53 (also arguing that a good faith test would force society to pay for the 
mistakes of its law enforcement officials; because of police infractions, courts would 
exclude evidence that would have been obtained through lawful means, and potentially 
dangerous criminals would escape conviction with impunity). 
127 See supra note 53 (explaining that proof of inevitable discovery severs any causal 
connection between the misconduct and the discovery of the challenged evidence).  See also 
supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing the ability of individuals who have been 
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C. The Inevitable Discovery Exception and Its Application to Primary 
Evidence 
Presently, a circuit split exists among the federal circuit courts of 
appeals concerning whether the inevitable discovery exception applies 
only to derivative evidence (evidence derived from the misconduct that 
is an unknown, indirect future byproduct that inevitably would have 
been obtained through legal means) or if it also reaches primary 
evidence (evidence immediately known and actually obtained directly 
after the misconduct).128  Some argue that application of the inevitable 
discovery exception to primary evidence would have the effect of 
encouraging police misconduct because, with respect to primary 
evidence, the police are frequently in a position to know whether 
evidence obtained through misconduct would inevitably have been 
discovered by lawful means.129 
Another argument for limiting application of the inevitable 
discovery exception to derivative evidence is that if it was extended to 
preserve primary evidence, the police could simply argue, in every case 
in which they had probable cause from which they could have obtained a 
warrant, that the evidence eventually would have lawfully been found 
because a search warrant could have been obtained.130  Desiring to 
eliminate the potential for such results, some courts have rather 
simplistically held that the inevitable discovery exception is not 
applicable to primary evidence.131  The Indiana Court of Appeals, 
                                                                                                             
denied rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution to recover damages under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 and the ability of individuals who have been denied rights guaranteed under 
Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution to recover damages under state tort law). 
128 See supra note 54 (discussing the split among the federal circuit courts of appeals with 
respect to the application of the inevitable discovery exception to primary evidence). 
129 See supra note 40 (explaining that one argument against application of the exception to 
primary evidence suggests that the Court’s decision in Nix was limited only to derivative 
evidence (information leading to the location of the victim’s body) because, with respect to 
derivative evidence, the exclusionary rule’s deterrent purpose is sufficiently safeguarded 
by the fact that the police officer cannot possibly have known at the time of his misconduct 
what unknown indirect future byproducts of his misconduct would be discovered and 
whether other independent lawful means would inevitably have resulted in the discovery 
of such byproducts.)  See Liljestrom, supra note 57, at 184.  On the contrary, the argument 
goes, the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule is completely destroyed with respect to 
primary evidence because the police officer is aware at the time of his misconduct of 
precisely what evidence will be obtained and is in a better position to determine whether 
the evidence would inevitably have been obtained if not for his misconduct.  Id. 
130 See supra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing two cases in which the Indiana 
Court of Appeals, applying federal law, has expressly refused under any circumstance to 
apply the inevitable discovery exception to primary evidence). 
131 See supra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing the arguments underlying 
decisions refusing to apply the inevitable discovery exception to primary evidence). 
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applying federal law in cases arising under the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, has accepted this argument and refused 
to apply the inevitable discovery exception to primary evidence, 
reasoning that if the exception were applied to primary evidence, “no 
warrantless search supported by probable cause would be invalid.”132  
This restriction of the exception to derivative evidence, however, is 
flawed because it fails to recognize that the decisive factor regarding 
whether the inevitable discovery exception should apply to certain 
evidence is not whether the evidence is primary or derivative but, rather, 
whether the causal link between the unlawful police conduct and the 
discovery of the evidence has been severed because the evidence would 
have been discovered by lawful means, regardless of the police 
misconduct.133 
Additionally, the need to exclude primary evidence from the scope 
of the inevitable discovery exception can be eviscerated simply by 
attaching an additional safeguard to the inevitable discovery doctrine:   a 
requirement that the police would have utilized proper and predictable 
investigative processes in the particular case and that such processes 
would have resulted in the lawful discovery of the challenged evidence.134  
For the reasons more fully discussed in Part III.D, it is not sufficient for 
inevitable discovery purposes that the police merely could have obtained 
a warrant.135  With a requirement of proof that certain investigative 
procedures would have been pursued, the concern that the inevitable 
discovery exception could be abused such that “no warrantless search 
supported by probable cause would be invalid[]” is eliminated, and any 
                                                 
132 LaMunion v. State, 740 N.E.2d 576, 581 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); Jorgensen v. State, 526 
N.E.2d 1004, 1008 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988).  In support of this reasoning, the court of appeals 
has rather unconvincingly argued that if the exception were extended to also preserve 
primary evidence, then the police could simply argue in every case, in which they had 
probable cause from which they could have obtained a warrant, that the evidence 
eventually would have been found lawfully because the search warrant could have been 
obtained.  See Lamunion, 740 N.E.2d at 581; Jorgensen, 526 N.E.2d at 1008.   
133 See supra note 53 (explaining that proof of inevitable discovery severs any causal 
connection between the misconduct and the discovery of the challenged evidence). 
134 See supra notes 58–67 and accompanying text (providing an example of a state court 
that requires the State to prove not merely that it could have obtained the challenged 
evidence by lawful means, but that it would have pursued such lawful procedures for 
obtaining the evidence in the particular case at issue). 
135 See supra note 61 (explaining that it is not sufficient that the police merely could have 
discovered the evidence by lawful means but, instead, requiring the State to prove that it 
would have obtained the evidence by lawful means). 
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distinction between primary and derivative evidence is rendered 
completely unnecessary.136 
The simple “one size fits all” approach taken by courts that have 
rejected the application of the inevitable discovery exception to primary 
evidence fails to take into account those cases in which primary evidence 
truly would have been discovered by lawful means and for which the 
inevitable discovery exception is completely appropriate.137  Under the 
rule that the inevitable discovery exception can never be applied to 
primary evidence, designed to ensure the protection of the deterrent 
purpose of the exclusionary rule, any primary evidence would be 
suppressed without regard to whether the evidence truly would have 
been discovered by lawful means and without reference to any prior 
misconduct.138  Such a result, however, runs directly counter to the 
Court’s holding in Nix v. Williams—that if the prosecution can establish 
that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been 
discovered by lawful means, then the deterrence rationale has so little 
basis that the evidence should be received.139 
                                                 
136 LaMunion, 740 N.E.2d at 581; see generally supra notes 58–67 (providing an example of a 
state court attaching additional safeguards to the inevitable discovery exception to protect 
it from judicial abuse while not barring the exception from reaching primary evidence). 
137 See generally supra Part I (providing an example of a case in which the inevitable 
discovery exception was correctly held to be applicable to primary evidence).  In United 
States v. Holland, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14090 (W.D. TN 2003), Officer Vaughn had obtained 
a valid search warrant for the home of Mr. Holland; however, prior to having an 
opportunity to execute the search warrant, two officers dispatched to Mr. Holland’s home 
in reference to a report of a deceased body in the trunk of a vehicle in Mr. Holland’s 
garage.  Id. at 5–7.  While investigating the reported presence of a body at Mr. Holland’s 
residence, the officers testified that they smelled a strong odor consistent with the 
decomposition of human remains emanating from the garage and that they observed a 
vehicle in the garage that matched the type of vehicle alleged to contain a deceased body.  
Id. at 7–8.  Rather than obtaining a search warrant, however, the officers forced entry into 
Mr. Holland’s garage and searched the trunk of the vehicle, wherein they discovered the 
challenged primary evidence:  the body of a murder victim.  Id. at 8–9.  The trial court held 
that this search was constitutionally unreasonable but denied the defendant’s motion to 
suppress the fruits of the unreasonable search because the evidence would inevitably have 
been discovered by Officer Vaughn pursuant to the search warrant that he had obtained 
and planned to execute in short order.  Id. at 21–23.  On the contrary, if the rule that the 
inevitable discovery exception does not apply to primary evidence had been applied in 
Holland, the evidence relating to the murder victim’s body undoubtedly would have been 
suppressed regardless of the fact that Officer Vaughn inevitably would have discovered the 
victim’s body pursuant to his validly obtained search warrant.  See id. at 23.   
138 See, e.g., supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text (providing an example of a state 
court decision holding that, although the inevitable discovery exception applies to 
derivative evidence, it does not save primary evidence from suppression). 
139 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984) (further explaining that “[a]nything less would reject logic, 
experience, and common sense”). 
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Much like the good faith requirement rejected by the Court in Nix, 
an absolute rule barring application of the inevitable discovery rule to 
primary evidence is intended to protect the deterrent purpose of the 
exclusionary rule.140  Also, like a requirement of good faith, removing 
primary evidence from the scope of the exception would at times require 
the exclusion of evidence that inevitably would have been discovered 
without any reference to illegal conduct.141  However, as the Court 
observed with respect to a good faith requirement, the societal costs of 
the exclusionary rule far outweigh any possible benefits to deterrence 
that an exclusion of primary evidence might produce, and such a result 
“wholly fails to take into account the enormous societal cost of excluding 
truth in the search for truth in the administration of justice.”142  Instead 
of losing sight of the basic logic of the inevitable discovery exception by 
focusing on unnecessary distinctions between primary and derivative 
evidence, the focus in inevitable discovery cases should at all times 
remain simply on whether the evidence truly would inevitably have 
been discovered by lawful means without reference to unlawful police 
conduct:  if the challenged evidence would inevitably have been 
discovered by lawful means, the causal link between any unlawful police 
                                                 
140 See supra note 71 (rejecting the application of the inevitable discovery exception to 
primary evidence, reasoning that the failure to exclude wrongfully obtained primary 
evidence would be an unacceptable dilution of the exclusionary rule that would encourage 
unlawful searches in the hope that probable cause would be developed after the fact). 
141 See generally Part I (providing an example of a case in which a blanket rejection of the 
applicability of the inevitable discovery exception to primary evidence would have 
resulted in the exclusion of evidence of a murder victim’s body regardless of the fact that 
the evidence would have been discovered in short order by lawful means and without 
reference to any unlawful police conduct). 
142 See Nix, 467 U.S. at 445.  The court held:  
if the government can prove that the evidence would have been 
obtained inevitably and, therefore, would have been admitted, 
regardless of any overreaching by the police, there is no rational basis to 
keep that evidence from the jury in order to ensure the fairness of the 
trial proceedings.  In that situation, the State has gained no advantage 
at trial and the defendant has suffered no prejudice.  Indeed, 
suppression of the evidence would operate to undermine the 
adversary system by putting the State in a worse position than it would 
have occupied without any police misconduct. 
Id. at 447 (emphasis added).  The court further argued that, contrary to the arguments of 
the courts requiring the exclusion of primary evidence—that police will be more prone to 
engage in misconduct when relatively certain that the evidence would inevitably have been 
discovered by lawful means—if “a police officer is aware that evidence inevitably will be 
discovered, he will try to avoid engaging in questionable practices . . . [because] ‘there will 
be little to gain from taking any dubious ‘shortcuts’ to obtain the evidence.”  Id. at 445-46. 
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conduct and the discovery of the evidence is severed, regardless of 
whether the challenged evidence was primary or derivative.143 
D. The Inevitable Discovery Exception and the Requirement of Active Pursuit 
Two other contentious issues over which courts are presently split 
are whether police may simply rely on the “could have gotten a warrant 
excuse[]” and whether the inevitable discovery exception requires a 
demonstration that the lawful means that made the discovery inevitable 
were being actively pursued prior to the occurrence of the illegal 
conduct.144  To resolve these issues, it is helpful to revisit the logic that 
determines the validity of the inevitable discovery exception:  when the 
evidence would inevitably have been obtained by lawful means, the 
illegality is not the legal cause of discovery at all if the challenged 
evidence would have been discovered without reference to the 
illegality.145  This logic, however, only holds where the illegally obtained 
evidence would have been obtained by lawful means; where the evidence 
would not have been so obtained, the sole cause of the discovery of the 
evidence, then, is the illegal conduct, and exclusion of the evidence is 
appropriate.146  Therefore, it is not sufficient that the police merely could 
have obtained the evidence by lawful means; rather, in any case in which 
the inevitable discovery rule is applicable, the state must show that the 
challenged evidence, in fact, would have been discovered because 
                                                 
143 See supra note 53 (explaining that proof of inevitable discovery severs any causal 
connection between the misconduct and the discovery of the challenged evidence).  See also 
United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736 (1st Cir. 1986).  In Silvestri, then Judge, now Justice, 
Breyer suggested that, rather than adopting bright-line rules not capable of adaptation to 
differing fact patterns, “the analysis [should] focus on the questions of independence and 
inevitability and remain flexible enough to handle the many different fact patterns which 
will be presented.”  Id. at 746. 
144 See Golden, supra note 54, at 125 (observing that the federal circuits have split on the 
issue of whether the police may simply rely on the “we could have gotten a warrant 
excuse” as proof that the evidence would have inevitably been discovered, whether the 
choice to disregard the warrant requirement eliminates the applicability of the exception, 
and whether the inevitable discovery exception requires a demonstration that the lawful 
means that made the discovery inevitable were being actively pursued prior to the 
occurrence of the illegal conduct).   
145 See supra note 53 (reasoning that proof of inevitable discovery severs any causal 
connection between the misconduct and the discovery of the challenged evidence). 
146 See Cohn, supra note 49, at 750 (arguing that “[i]n any case in which the inevitable 
discovery rule is applicable, the court must examine thoroughly the facts of the case before 
the rule is introduced, in order to determine if the evidence indeed would have been 
discovered regardless of the police's misconduct[]”, and further arguing that “[a] spotty 
and imprecise treatment of the facts[] . . . leads to a mechanical application of the rule and 
detracts from the logic that determines its validity[]”). 
Shively: The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine: Indiana as the Exception, Not
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008
448 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
proving anything less is tantamount to failing to prove that the discovery 
of the evidence was truly inevitable.147   
In Flippo,148 the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia 
considered whether the inevitable discovery exception, under West 
Virginia law, should require the prosecution to demonstrate that the 
police were actively pursuing the lawful means that would inevitably 
have led to the discovery of the illegally obtained evidence.  Rejecting 
the approach of the majority of jurisdictions, the court reasoned that “[i]f 
police are allowed to search when they possess no lawful means and are 
only required to show that lawful means could have been available even 
though not pursued, the narrow ‘inevitable discovery’ exception would 
‘swallow’ the [constitutional warrant] protection.”149 
In Smith,150 the Alaska Supreme Court similarly perceived “a need to 
safeguard against the use of the inevitable discovery exception in cases 
where discovery by legal means was possible, but not truly 
                                                 
147 See generally supra notes 58–67 and accompanying text (providing an example of a 
state court perceiving the need to protect against application of the inevitable discovery 
exception in cases in which “discovery by legal means was possible, but not truly 
inevitable[]”).   In Smith v. State, 948 P.2d 473, 480 (Alaska 1997), addressing this concern, 
the court held as follows: 
The exception should come into play only when the evidence in 
question truly would have been discovered through procedures likely 
to be employed under the circumstances, rather than through unusual 
measures which police would only employ if given the benefit of 
hindsight.  Accordingly, in order to invoke the exception, the 
prosecution ‘must establish, first, that certain proper and predictable 
investigatory procedures would have been utilized in the case at bar, 
and second, that those procedures would have inevitably resulted in 
the discovery of the evidence in question.’ 
Id. (citation omitted). 
148 212 W. Va. 560, 580, 575 S.E.2d 170, 189 (W. Va. 2002).  In Flippo, the court noted that a 
minority of federal and state courts take the position that the parameters of the inevitable 
discovery rule should not be so broad as to legitimize an unlawful seizure of evidence 
merely because the police subsequently obtained, or could have obtained, a search warrant 
that would have led to the ultimate seizure of that evidence.  Id. at 579, 575 S.E.2d at 189.  
On the contrary, the court found that a majority of federal and state courts apply a broad 
scope for the inevitable discovery rule, by not requiring the police to have initiated lawful 
means to acquire evidence prior to its seizure.  Id. 
149 Id. at 580, 575 S.E.2d at 190 (citing LAFAVE, supra note 48, at 11.4).  Accordingly, the 
court in Flippo held that to prevail under the inevitable discovery exception to the 
exclusionary rule, West Virginia’s Constitution requires the State to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence:  (1) that there was a reasonable probability that the 
evidence would have been discovered by lawful means in the absence of police 
misconduct; (2) that the leads making the discovery inevitable were possessed by the police 
at the time of the misconduct; and (3) that the police were actively pursuing a lawful 
alternative line of investigation to seize the evidence prior to the time of the misconduct.  
Id. at 581, 575 S.E.2d at 191. 
150 948 P.2d 473 (Alaska 1997). 
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inevitable.”151  Contrary to the court’s approach in Flippo, however, the 
Smith court held only that “in order to invoke the exception, the 
prosecution ‘must establish, first, that certain proper and predictable 
investigatory procedures would have been utilized in the case at bar, and 
second, that those procedures would have inevitably resulted in the 
discovery of the evidence in question.”152 
Like the Smith court, other courts have rejected a rule of active 
pursuit as too rigid and inflexible, electing instead to focus specifically 
on the questions of independence and inevitability.153  Although the 
opinions of the courts in Flippo and Smith vary to some degree, and 
Silvestri to a larger degree, they are similar in that they all require proof 
that the police would, rather than could, have obtained the evidence by 
lawful means.154  As previously discussed, such a requirement is 
essential to protecting the logic that underlies the inevitable discovery 
exception.155  Thus, where it can be established that evidence obtained 
through police misconduct would inevitably have been discovered 
through lawful means, the inquiry should end, regardless of whether the 
police were actively pursuing the evidence at the moment of the 
illegality.156 
                                                 
151 Id. at 480 (holding that “[t]he exception should come into play only when the evidence 
in question truly would have been discovered through procedures likely to be 
employed under the circumstances, rather than through unusual measures which police 
would only employ if given the benefit of hindsight[]”). 
152 Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citing LAFAVE, supra note 48, at 11.4).  In so holding, 
the Smith court did not require, as did the Flippo court, that the prosecution show that a 
lawful alternative line of investigation was actively being pursued prior to the time of the 
misconduct.  Id. 
153 See United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 746 (1st Cir. 1986) (concluding that there is 
no necessary requirement that the warrant application process have already been initiated 
at the time the illegal search took place and suggesting instead that, rather than adopting 
bright-line rules not capable of adaptation to differing fact patterns, “the analysis [should] 
focus on the questions of independence and inevitability and remain flexible enough to 
handle the many different fact patterns which will be presented”). 
154 See generally supra Part III.D (discussing the approaches courts have taken in response 
to the perceived need to protect against application of the inevitable discovery exception in 
cases in which it is possible that evidence could have been discovered by legal means, but 
not truly inevitable). 
155 Cohn, supra note 49, at 750 (arguing that “[i]n any case in which the inevitable 
discovery rule is applicable, the court must examine thoroughly the facts of the case before 
the rule is introduced, in order to determine if the evidence indeed would have been 
discovered regardless of the police's misconduct,” and further arguing that “[a] spotty and 
imprecise treatment of the facts[] . . . leads to a mechanical application of the rule and 
detracts from the logic that determines its validity[]”). 
156 Hessler, supra note 54, at 278 (arguing against the adoption of the active pursuit 
doctrine as an unsupported extension of the Court’s holding in Nix that operates as a 
formalistic “‘bright-line’ rule ill-equipped to address the multiple fact patterns that 
implicate the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule[]” and arguing in favor of the adoption 
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Applying these principles, the Alaska Supreme Court adopted a 
logical formulation of the inevitable discovery doctrine:  the prosecution 
“must establish, first, that certain proper and predictable investigatory 
procedures would have been utilized in the case at bar, and second, that 
those procedures would have inevitably resulted in the discovery of the 
evidence in question.”157  Thus, under the foregoing test, police will be 
precluded from simply utilizing the “could have gotten a warrant 
excuse,” and will be required to prove that they would have obtained a 
warrant, or that they would have pursued other proper and predictable 
investigative procedures that would inevitably have led to the lawful 
discovery of the challenged evidence.158  Additionally, the test provided 
in Smith does not require application of a rigid and inflexible rule of 
active pursuit that so concerned the First Circuit in Silvestri.159  Instead, 
the Smith test simply permits application of flexible rules that preserve 
the logic of the inevitable discovery exception by requiring proof that the 
evidence would have been discovered, without imposing additional 
unnecessary obstacles to the admission of evidence of unquestioned 
truth in the quest for justice.160 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION:  A PROPOSED SOLUTION TO THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY 
CONTROVERSY 
Although the inevitable discovery doctrine has enjoyed nearly 
universal acceptance throughout its now well-established history, courts 
often have failed to formulate the doctrine in a manner that remains true 
                                                                                                             
of an “independent circumstances test” that would establish inevitability in the absence of 
active pursuit). 
157 See Smith, 948 P.2d at 480 (internal quotations omitted) (citing 5 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure 11.4 (3d ed. 1996)) (recognizing that the exception should be available 
only when the challenged evidence truly would have been discovered through procedures 
that would have been employed in the case at issue). 
158 See generally notes 58–67 and accompanying text (describing the approach taken by the 
Alaska Supreme Court in Smith v. State, 948 P.2d 473 (Alaska 1997), in response to its 
perceived need to protect against application of the inevitable discovery exception in cases 
in which it is possible that evidence could have been discovered by legal means, but was 
not truly inevitable). 
159 See United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 746 (1st Cir. 1986) (concluding that there is 
no necessary requirement that the warrant application process have already been initiated 
at the time the illegal search took place and suggesting instead that, rather than adopting 
bright-line rules not capable of adaptation to differing fact patterns, “the analysis [should] 
focus on the questions of independence and inevitability and remain flexible enough to 
handle the many different fact patterns which will be presented”). 
160 See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 n.5 (1984) (in which the Supreme Court 
explained that it was “unwilling to impose added burdens on the already difficult task of 
proving guilt in criminal cases by enlarging the barrier to placing evidence of unquestioned 
truth before juries.”). 
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to the logic upon which the doctrine depends.161  Further, contrary to the 
great weight of authority, Indiana has categorically, and unjustifiably, 
rejected the exception based on a faulty understanding of the 
fundamental premise underlying the doctrine.162  Responding to this 
dilemma, Part IV.A reiterates the basic logic of the inevitable discovery 
exception and proposes a logical formulation of the inevitable discovery 
doctrine to be applied by Indiana judges when considering whether the 
inevitable discovery exception is applicable to a particular set of facts.163  
Part IV.B applies the guidelines of Holland to a real-life fact pattern to 
illustrate the need for, and proper application of, the inevitable discovery 
exception.164 
Many problems and shortcomings exist with respect to the various 
formulations of the inevitable discovery exception adopted by the 
Supreme Court and the states.  Reflecting back on the fundamental 
premise of the inevitable discovery exception that illegality is not the 
legal cause of discovery if the evidence would have been discovered 
regardless of the illegality, the inevitable discovery exception simply is 
inappropriate where it is unclear whether the challenged evidence 
would have been discovered without the illegality.165  The absence of 
adequate safeguards allows for the improper application of the 
inevitable discovery exception in cases in which it is unclear whether the 
                                                 
161 See State v. Flippo, 575 S.E.2d 170, 188 (W.V. 2002) (observing that “[i]t has been 
suggested that ‘in carving out the ‘inevitable discovery’ exception . . . courts must use a 
surgeon’s scalpel and not a meat axe,’” (citing LAFAVE, supra note 48, at 244), however, “[a] 
review of judicial opinions reveal that federal and state courts have used a ‘scalpel’ and a 
‘meat axe’ in carving out guidelines for the inevitable discovery rule[]”; and that “there is a 
split of authority among federal and state courts on the requirements for establishing the 
inevitable discovery rule”). 
162 See supra note 76 (arguing that, in the haste of the court of appeals in Ammons to reject 
the inevitable discovery exception as a matter of Indiana constitutional law, the court 
misunderstood the basic logic underlying the inevitable discovery exception that “[t]he 
illegality is not the cause of discovery at all, for ‘[c]onduct is not a legal cause of an event if 
the event would have occurred without it[]’”, and also arguing that the court failed to 
recognize that the inevitable discovery exception is wholly consistent with the Indiana 
Supreme Court’s recitation of the general rule that evidence obtained as the result of an 
unreasonable search must be suppressed).  See also Brown v. State, 653 N.E.2d 77, 80 (Ind. 
1995). 
163 See infra Part IV.A (explaining the logic of the inevitable discovery exception and 
proposing a logical formulation to be applied by Indiana courts). 
164 See infra Part IV.B (applying the proposed formulation to the facts of United States v. 
Holland described in Part I of this Note). 
165 See Cohn, supra note 49, at 750 (arguing that “[i]n any case in which the inevitable 
discovery rule is applicable, the court must examine thoroughly the facts of the case before 
the rule is introduced, in order to determine if the evidence indeed would have been 
discovered regardless of the police’s misconduct.”). 
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police would inevitably have discovered the challenged evidence.166  In 
such instances, the inevitable discovery exception exclusively serves as 
an illegitimate abrogation of the exclusionary rule.167  The proposed 
formulation reformulates the inevitable discovery doctrine, as adopted 
by the Supreme Court in Nix, so as to remedy these shortcomings and to 
provide a systematic process through which Indiana courts should apply 
the inevitable discovery doctrine.168   
The guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court in Nix, and by many 
states since Nix, are inconsistent and often fail to delineate the proper 
contours of the inevitable discovery exception.169  Specifically, in many 
jurisdictions, the government’s burden of proof is too relaxed;170 the 
good or bad faith of the offending officer is inappropriately held to be 
dispositive;171 the exception is applied where the government merely 
could have, rather than would have, discovered the evidence by lawful 
means;172 and application of the exception is unnecessarily restricted 
                                                 
166 See Cohn, supra note 49, at 750 (arguing that “[a] spotty and imprecise treatment of 
the facts[] . . . leads to a mechanical application of the rule and detracts from the logic that 
determines its validity[]”). 
167 See Webb, supra note 51, at 1003 (arguing that the “warm embrace of such an 
impermissibly designed interference with sixth amendment rights is an abomination to the 
integrity of our judicial system.”). 
168 See generally infra Part IV (proposing a logical formulation of the inevitable discovery 
doctrine and applying the proposed formulation to the facts of United States v. Holland as 
described in Part I of this Note). 
169 See supra note 59 (explaining that despite the scholarly debate, however, the inevitable 
discovery exception can and should be formulated so that it meets the concerns expressed 
by critics of the exception). 
170 See generally Part III.A (explaining that proof by a preponderance of the evidence is 
inadequate to prove that the discovery of evidence was truly inevitable and arguing that 
the standard of proof by clear and convincing evidence is necessary in inevitable discovery 
cases). 
171 See generally note 53 (explaining that proof of inevitable discovery by lawful means 
and without reference to the unlawful conduct severs the causal link between the unlawful 
conduct and the discovery of the evidence and, therefore, that the mens rea of the 
offending officer is wholly irrelevant in inevitable discovery cases).  See also Nix v. 
Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 456 (1984) (explaining that “[a]dmission of the victim’s body, if it 
would have been discovered anyway, means that the trial in this case was not the product 
of an inquisitorial process; that process was untainted by illegality.  The good or bad faith 
of [the detective] . . . is therefore simply irrelevant[]”).  See also supra note 67 (explaining 
that if the State carries the burden and proves inevitable discovery by separate, 
independent means, thus leaving the State in no better and no worse position, any question 
of good faith, bad faith, mistake or inadvertence is simply irrelevant). 
172 See generally note 63 (explaining that proof that the police could have obtained the 
challenged evidence by lawful means is completely inadequate in inevitable discovery 
cases; rather, arguing that the State must show that the police would have utilized proper 
procedures in the case at issue and that such procedures would inevitably have let to the 
lawful discovery of the challenged evidence). 
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only to derivative evidence.173  Although courts have articulated specific 
factors to be considered in inevitable discovery cases, such formulations 
of the exception often have lost sight of, and are incongruous with, the 
sound rationale upon which the exception is based.174 
A.  Logical Formulation of the Inevitable Discovery Doctrine 
The proposed formulation of the inevitable discovery doctrine, 
which would apply to Indiana courts, provides a two-step test that 
Indiana judges should apply when determining whether the inevitable 
discovery exception may properly be applied to a particular set of facts.  
This approach, which expands upon the basic, but inadequate, 
guidelines enunciated by the Supreme Court in Nix, sets forth a test by 
which courts, consistent with public policy and the important goals of 
the exclusionary rule, should analyze the facts in inevitable discovery 
cases.  Unlike the Supreme Court’s deferential approach to inevitable 
discovery,175 the proposed formulation, through the reformulation of the 
guidelines provided in Nix, ensures that the inevitable discovery 
exception will only be applied in appropriate cases by requiring courts to 
examine thoroughly the facts of the case under a heightened standard of 
proof, in order to determine if the evidence indeed would have been 
discovered regardless of any police misconduct. 
The proposed formulation of the inevitable discovery doctrine is as 
follows:  when the prosecution can show, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that illegally obtained evidence inevitably would have been 
discovered without reference to the unlawful police conduct, through 
lawful and predictable investigative processes that would have been 
                                                 
173 See generally Part II.C (explaining that any distinction between primary and derivative 
evidence in inevitable discovery cases is unnecessary and inappropriate because the 
decisive issue in inevitable discovery cases is not the type of evidence, but whether the 
evidence indeed would inevitably have been discovered by lawful means and without 
reference to the prior illegality). 
174 See LAFAVE, supra note 48, at 243–44 (observing that the arguments of critics of the 
inevitable discovery doctrine “are directed not so much to the rule itself as to its 
application in a loose and unthinking fashion” and suggesting that courts must take care to 
ensure that the inevitable discovery exception is only applied in appropriate cases). 
175 See Webb, supra note 51, at 1003 (passionately arguing that, although the inevitable 
discovery exception may be appropriate in some cases, the Court’s adoption of a lesser 
standard of proof by a preponderance of the evidence amounted to an encouragement of 
constitutional violations by police, that “Chief Justice Burger has openly condoned as well 
as encouraged [constitutional violations]—so much so, in our opinion, as to elevate the 
high court from the status of a mere ‘accomplice’ to one of ‘co-conspirator’ to such illegal 
activity,” and concluding that “[t]he Supreme Court’s warm embrace of such an 
impermissibly designed interference with [constitutional] rights is an abomination to the 
integrity of our judicial system”). 
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utilized in the case at bar, the inevitable discovery exception should be 
available to preserve the challenged evidence, regardless of the good or 
bad faith of the officer who engaged in the initial police misconduct, and 
regardless of whether the evidence to be discovered was primary or 
derivative. 
B. Application of the Proposed Formulation of the Inevitable Discovery 
Exception 
The proposed formulation of the inevitable discovery exception 
delineates the precise circumstances in which the inevitable discovery 
exception is appropriate and provides a systematic process for the 
proper determination of whether the exception may correctly be applied 
to a particular set of facts.176  By reformulating the basic analytical 
framework adopted by the Court in Nix, the proposed formulation 
ensures that the exception will not swallow the exclusionary rule. 
The proposed formulation’s systematic process restricts the scope of 
the exception so that it may only be applied in cases in which the 
government has satisfied a heightened burden of proof as to whether the 
challenged evidence would inevitably have been discovered by lawful 
means.  Moreover, the proposed formulation is consistent with public 
policy in that it limits application of the exclusionary rule to those cases 
in which its purposes are most efficaciously served:  where police 
misconduct is, in fact, the legal cause of the discovery of the challenged 
evidence.  Where police misconduct is not the legal cause of discovery, 
blind adherence to the exclusionary rule is not only unwise and 
improper, it wholly fails to take into account the enormous societal cost 
of excluding truth in the administration of justice.177 
By applying the proposed formulation to the facts of Holland 
described in Part I, the necessity for the adoption of the formulation can 
best be illustrated.  Ordinarily, the exclusionary rule would require the 
exclusion of evidence of the murder victim’s body obtained as a result of 
the unlawful search of Holland’s garage by the offending patrol 
officers.178  However, application of the inevitable discovery exception, 
                                                 
176 See generally supra Part III and accompanying text (analyzing the strengths and 
weaknesses of the various formulations of the inevitable discovery doctrine). 
177 See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 445 (1984) (explaining that the exclusion of evidence 
that inevitably would have been discovered without any reference to illegal conduct 
“wholly fails to take into account the enormous societal cost of excluding truth in the 
search for truth in the administration of justice[]” and that “[n]othing in [the Supreme] 
Court’s prior holdings supports any such formalistic, pointless, and punitive approach[]”). 
178 See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text; see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 
(1961) (holding that “all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the 
Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court”). 
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as proposed in this Note, provides a much more just result:  where the 
prosecution can show, by clear and convincing evidence, that the body, 
illegally discovered by the offending patrol officers, would have 
inevitably been discovered by Officer Vaughn without reference to the 
illegality, through Officer’s Vaughn’s utilization of the lawful 
investigative process of executing a search warrant, the inevitable 
discovery exception will operate to preserve the challenged evidence, 
regardless of the good or bad faith of the patrol officers who engaged in 
the initial police misconduct, and regardless of the fact that Amanda’s 
body was primary rather than derivative evidence. 
In Holland, the evidence clearly and convincingly established that 
Amanda’s body would have been discovered by Officer Vaughn through 
the lawful investigative process of executing a validly issued search 
warrant.179  Consequently, because the evidence clearly establishes that 
Amanda’s body would lawfully have been discovered notwithstanding 
the misconduct of the patrol officers, the fundamental premise of the 
inevitable discovery exception—that illegal police misconduct is not the 
legal cause of the discovery of evidence if the evidence would have 
inevitably been discovered without the illegality—is satisfied.180 
Additionally, even if the patrol officers who discovered Amanda’s 
body had done so in bad faith with the intent to violate Holland’s rights, 
the inevitable discovery exception is still applicable because the conduct 
of the offending patrol officers is irrelevant to whether the inevitable 
discovery exception should be applicable in a particular case.181  Instead, 
the lawful means through which Officer Vaughn would have discovered 
Amanda’s body, implicit in which was Officer Vaughn’s good faith 
intent, replaced the misconduct as the legal cause of the discovery of 
Amanda’s body.182 
                                                 
179 See generally supra Part I (explaining that the evidence showed not that Officer Vaughn 
could have obtained a search warrant that could have led to the discovery of Amanda’s 
body, but that Officer Vaughn had already obtained a warrant to search Holland’s garage 
and that Officer Vaughn had already made arrangements to execute the warrant in short 
order). 
180 See supra note 49 (explaining that the illegality is not the cause of discovery at all in 
inevitable discovery cases because conduct is not a legal cause of an event if the event 
would have occurred without the illegality). 
181 See supra note 53 (explaining that proof of inevitable discovery by lawful means severs 
any causal connection between the police misconduct and the discovery of the challenged 
evidence and, thus, it makes no sense to invoke a good or bad faith test because the mens 
rea of the offending officer is irrelevant to the question of causation).   
182 See, e.g., State v. Garner, 331 N.C. 491, 507, 417 S.E.2d 502, 511 (N.C. 1992) (providing 
an example of a state court decision holding that holding that:  
[i]f the State finds itself in any situation where it must prove that the 
evidence inevitably would have been discovered by other legal, 
independent means, and it fails to do so, the doctrine is not applied 
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Finally, the inevitable discovery exception was properly applied 
regardless of the fact that the evidence at issue, Amanda’s body, was 
primary rather than derivative.183  The evidence in Holland clearly 
showed that, without reference to the unlawful conduct of the patrol 
officers, Officer Vaughn had obtained and made arrangements to execute 
a search warrant for Holland’s garage.184  With the proposed 
requirement of proof that proper investigative procedures would have 
been pursued, the concern that application of the inevitable discovery 
exception to primary evidence would allow for abuse of the exception in 
any case in which the police merely could have obtained a warrant is 
eliminated, and any distinction between primary and derivative 
evidence is rendered completely unnecessary.185 
                                                                                                             
and the evidence is suppressed.  This risk of suppression inherently 
preserves the deterrence value of the exclusionary rule.  Further, if the 
State carries its burden and proves inevitable discovery by separate, 
independent means, thus leaving the State in no better and no worse 
position, any question of good faith, bad faith, mistake or inadvertence 
is simply irrelevant 
Id. at 507, 417 S.E.2d at 511.  See also Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 456 (1984).  Justice 
Stevens, concurring with the majority in Nix, also rejected any requirement of proof of the 
absence of bad faith on the part of the offending officer, explaining: 
Admission of the victim’s body, if it inevitably would have been discovered 
anyway, means that the trial in this case was not the product of an 
inquisitorial process; that process was untainted by illegality.  The 
good or bad faith of [the detective] is therefore simply irrelevant.  If the 
trial process was not tainted as a result of his conduct, this defendant 
received the type of trial that the Sixth Amendment envisions. 
Id. 
183 See generally supra Part III.C (explaining that any distinction between primary and 
derivative evidence in inevitable discovery cases is unwarranted and inappropriate 
because application of the exception does not depend on the type of evidence at issue but, 
rather, the decisive factor is whether the challenged evidence indeed would have been 
discovered by lawful means and without reference to any unlawful police conduct). 
184 See generally supra Part I and accompanying text (describing the facts of United States v. 
Holland, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14090 (W.D. TN 2003), and providing an excellent example 
of a case in which the inevitable discovery exception was correctly held to be applicable to 
primary evidence). 
185 See supra notes 136–38 and accompanying text (observing that the “one size fits all” 
approach taken by courts that have required the exclusion of primary evidence in 
inevitable discovery cases fails to give any consideration to cases such as Holland, in which 
primary evidence truly would have been discovered by lawful means and for which the 
inevitable discovery exception is completely appropriate).  See also generally Part III.C 
(explaining that courts that have refused to apply the inevitable discovery exception to 
primary evidence fail to recognize that the decisive factor in determining whether the 
inevitable discovery exception should apply to certain evidence is not whether the 
evidence is primary or derivative but, rather, whether the evidence truly would have 
inevitably been discovered by lawful means). 
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As illustrated by the facts in Holland, the inevitable discovery 
exception is a valuable and necessary exception to the exclusionary 
rule.186  Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Nix laid the 
groundwork for the inevitable discovery exception, the guidelines 
provided by the Court are inadequate to ensure the proper application of 
the exception.  Thus, the proposed formulation reformulates the 
inevitable discovery doctrine, as adopted by the Supreme Court in Nix, 
so as to remedy these shortcomings and to provide a systematic process 
through which courts, consistent with the spirit of the exclusionary rule, 
should apply the inevitable discovery doctrine. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Although the states have not been uniform in their treatment of the 
inevitable discovery doctrine, states have nearly universally accepted the 
doctrine as a legitimate and necessary exception to the exclusionary rule 
that can and should be formulated so that it may conform to the 
respective state’s constitution.  However, rejecting the reasoning of 
virtually every court to consider the issue and without engaging in any 
significant analysis, the Indiana Court of Appeals, in Ammons, 
categorically rejected the inevitable discovery doctrine as a matter of 
Indiana constitutional law.  In an effort to correct the anomalous decision 
in Ammons, this Note proposes a sound and logical formulation of the 
inevitable discovery doctrine that remains true to the fundamental logic 
upon which the validity of the doctrine depends and which 
appropriately should be applied by Indiana judges in inevitable 
discovery cases.   
The first step in the proposed formulation requires the state to prove 
by clear and convincing evidence that unlawfully obtained evidence 
would have inevitably been discovered by lawful means.  This step was 
satisfied in Holland, discussed in Part I, as the state clearly and 
convincingly proved that Officer Vaughn would have discovered the 
murder victim’s body, in short order, through the execution of a validly 
issued warrant and without reference to the illegal conduct of the patrol 
officers.   
The second step in the proposed formulation was also satisfied in 
Holland, as the state clearly and convincingly proved that proper and 
predictable investigative processes would have been utilized in the case 
in question and that such procedures would inevitably have led to the 
lawful discovery of the challenged evidence.  The evidence in Holland 
                                                 
186 See generally supra Part I (providing an excellent example of a case in which the 
inevitable discovery exception was properly applied). 
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was clear that Officer Vaughn did obtain a search warrant and that, 
pursuant to that warrant, he would inevitably have lawfully discovered 
the murder victim’s body.  Thus, as steps one and two were satisfied by 
the state in Holland, the court properly held that the inevitable discovery 
exception was applicable. 
Any dispute as to whether the patrol officers acted in bad faith to 
violate Holland’s constitutional rights, and the fact that the challenged 
evidence—the murder victim’s body—was primary rather than 
derivative, is immaterial to the inevitable discovery analysis.  The 
decisive issue in inevitable discovery cases, as set forth in the two steps 
of the proposed formulation, is whether clear and convincing evidence 
exists that the challenged evidence would lawfully have been discovered 
without reference to any prior police misconduct.  Once this standard 
has been satisfied, the inquiry ends because, in that instance, any causal 
link between the unlawful police conduct and the discovery of the 
evidence is severed. 
When properly administered, the inevitable discovery exception is a 
logical principle that necessarily must be applied to protect against the 
enormous societal cost of inappropriately withholding reliable evidence 
from truth-seeking jurors and to prevent the gifting of a windfall upon 
very fortunate, but undeserving, defendants.  Nevertheless, until the 
Indiana Supreme Court corrects the anomaly created by the 
unprecedented decision of the Indiana Court of Appeals in Ammons and 
adopts the inevitable discovery doctrine as a constitutional exception to 
the exclusionary rule as a matter of Indiana constitutional law, Indiana 
will continue as the exception to an almost universally accepted rule. 
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